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FOREWORD 
This  document contains the r e su l t s  of the  rel iabil i ty and safety 
ana lys i s  effort  pe r fo rmed  during the  Phase  111 Nuclear Shuttle 
System Definition Study. Reliability and safety con s iderat ions  
for  both t he  Class  1 Hybrid and Class  3 Reusable Nuclear Shuttle 
(RNS) concepts a r e  t r e a t ed  he re .  This work was accomplislied 
for the  National Aeronaut ics  and Space Administrat ion,  George C .  
Mar  shall  Space Flight  Center ,  Huntsville, Alabama,  under 
Contract  NAS8- 24714. The final r epo r t  was  generated to  fulfill 
the requ i rements  of DRL No. MSFC- DRL- 196, Line I tem 3 ,  and 
it cove r s  the  per iod f r o m  1 May 1970 t o  1 May 1971. 
The study effor ts  descr ibed  in th is  volume were  per formed  under 
the di rect ion of R. G. Riedese l  and C.  B. Boehmer ,  with respon-  
sibil i ty f o r  specific act iv i t ies  a s  follows: 
R. S.  Cowls-Mission Analysis  
R. V. Hauver-Performance Analysis  
R. Luna-System Reliability Analysis  

PREFACE 
The ma te r i a l  contained in th i s  document r e p r e s e n t s  a port ion of t he  final 
r epo r t  documentation for the  Phase  I11 Nuclear Shuttle System Definition 
Study. The study effort  was  pe r fo rmed  a s  a 12-month extension t o  the  
exist ing Nuclear Flight  System Definition Study Contract  (NAS8- 2471 4) ,  with 
the objective of establishing Phase  A conceptual definition for  two c l a s s e s  of 
r eusab le  nuclear  shutt le concepts.  The f i r s t  concept c l a s s  i s  cha rac t e r i zed  
a s  a 33-f t -diameter  configuration that  i s  launched integrally to orbi t  by a 
Saturn V INT-21 vehicle.  The second concept c l a s s  i s  charac te r ized  a s  a 
modular configuration which i s  a s sembled  in ea r th  orbi t  f r o m  modules 
c a r r i e d  t o  orbi t  in a space shutt le.  
The final r epo r t  documentation h a s  been organized to  provide separab le  
information for the two concepts,  whe re  appropr ia te ,  and to  combine r epo r t  
ma te r i a l  common t o  both concepts in singular documents.  The total docu- 
mentation for the  study i s  l i s t ed  below, with t h i s  document identified in the 
left  marg in .  
o Volume I: Executive Summary  
Volume 11: Concept and Feasibi l i ty  Analysis  
P a r t  A-Class 1 Hybrid RNS 
o Book 1-System Analysis  and Operations 
o Book 2-System Definition 
P a r t  B-Class 3 RNS 
o Book ]-System Analysis  and Operations 
o Book 2-System Definition 
Volume 111: P r o g r a m  Support Requi rements  
o P a r t  A-Class 1 Hybrid RNS 
o P a r t  B-Class 3 RNS 
o P a r t  C-Test P r o g r a m  Analyses and SRT Requirements  
Volume IV: Cost Data 
o P a r t  A-Class 1 Hybrid RNS 
o P a r t  B-Class 3 RNS 
o Volume V: Schedules, Miles tones ,  and Networks 
e Volume VI: Reliability and Safety Analysis  
o Volume VII: RNS P ro j ec t  Requirements  
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Section 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This volume contains the r e su l t s  of the realibil i ty and safety analyses ,  wbrch 
were  per formed for the Phase 111 Study a s  an integrated effort using the 
philosophy that the key to  safety i s  reliabil i ty.  The p remise  h e r e  i s  that i f  
a proper ly  designed sys tem pe r fo rms  in the manner i t  was intended, itwwili 
not c r ea t e  a safety problem.  
The reliabil i ty analysis  investigated every fa i lu re  mode of eve ry  component 
of major subsystems,  except s t ruc tures ,  on the RNS system to determine 
the effect of a fa i lure .  The i tems  that  could cause lo s s  of the RNS were  
identified a s  flight cr i t ical  i t ems  and were  quantified in a single fa i lure  
analysis .  These i t ems  were  then ranked in order  of decreasing cr i t ical i t ies ,  
and a reliabil i ty prediction of the RNS was made. 
The safety analysis  extended th i s  reliability analysis  by an  investigation of 
the flight cr i t ical  i t ems  and definition of a s e r i e s  of recommendations for 
elimination of the  flight cr i t ical  s ta tus ,  or  reduction in i t s  probability of 
occurrence.  Multiple fa i lu res  were  investigated in a top- down fault t r e e  
analysis .  An abor t  analysis  was performed to  determine the operational 
problems caused by fa i lu res  during the mission.  The abort  analysis and the 
fa i lures  were  then combined to  produce a contingency plan, i.  e . ,  a plan of 
action to  follow if a fa i lure  occurs .  
The safety effort during this  phase of the study was concentrated on Ihc 
elimination or reduction of specific fa i lures  and thus the reduction of the 
overall  probability of fa i lure  (and creat ion of safety problems)  to  a nlrnirnunn. 
It i s  felt that th is  should be the p r imary  concern a t  th is  t ime .  The relrab1:ty 
and safety analyses  and sub sequent recommendations and inputs mus t  be 
available a t  an  ear ly  date in sufficient t ime  t o  affect the  design effort ,  T l ~ c  
specific r e su l t s  of safe ty  incidents (e. g . ,  radiobiological effects of impac t  of 
radioactive por t ions  of NERVA) can  be de te rmined  a t  a l a t e r  date t o  fo rmu-  
late the envixonment s ta tements .  
The resu l t s  of the  re l iabi l i ty  analysis ,  including the  fa i lu re  mode effects 
anaLysis (FMEA) and c r i t i ca l i ty  analysis ,  a r e  contained in  Section 2. The 
contingency planning work shee t s  (CPWS), fault t r e e s ,  abor t  analys is ,  and 
con4tingenc y plan compris ing the total  safety analysis  effort  a r e  contained i n  
Section 3 ,  
Section 2 
RE LIABILITY ANALYSIS 
A p re l im ina ry  re l iabi l i ty  analysis  was  per formed  on the  init ial  RNS design 
(p r imar i l y  the r e su l t s  f r o m  P h a s e  11) and specific recommendat ions  were 
made  to improve the design rel iabil i ty and safe ty .  The designs  which resulteci 
f r o m  these  recommendat ions  and f r o m  newly incorporated Phase  111 design 
modifications we re  then subjected to a fo rma l  rel iabil i ty analysis  consist ing 
of the fa i lu re  mode and effects analysis  (Section 2. 3 )  and a cr i t ica l i ty  
analysis  (Section 2.  4 ) .  The fa i lure  mode effects analysis  (FMEA) i s  a 
qualitative analysis  which i s  used to delineate flight c r i t i c a l  i t ems  ( F C I )  
which could cause  loss  of the RNS. The cr i t ica l i ty  analysis  quantifies and 
ranks  the FCI  to produce the probabil i ty of s tage l o s s  a s  a function of the 
applicable fa i lure  modes  of the  flight c r i t i c a l  i t ems .  
These  data we re  then utilized in the safety analysis  (Section 3) .  A contingency 
planning worksheet  (CPWS) (Section 3.  1 )  was  p r epa red  for e ach  flight c r ~ t i c a l  
i t e m  to fu r ther  analyze the r e su l t s  of fa i lure ,  the  causes  of fa i lu res ,  l ine 
possible  cor rec t ive  act ions ,  and the emergency  detection r e q u i r e m e ~ i t s .  The 
c u r r e n t  re l iabi l i ty  ana lys i s  i s  the re fore  a single fa i lure  analysis .  A fault 
t r e e  ana lys i s  (FTA)  (Section 3.  2)  was  a l so  initiated to  study the e f fec t s  of 
mult iple fa i lu res .  A contingency plan (Section 3 .  4 )  was then developed 
utilizing the data f r o m  the FMEA, CPWS, and a n  abor t  analys is  (Section 3 .  3 )  
to delineate the operat ional  requ i rements  placed on the RNS by the safety 
cons t ra in t s .  
2 . 1  SUMMARY O F  RESULTS 
Reliability ana lyses  for  the Class  1 Hybrid RNS and the C la s s  3 RNS were  
per formed  dur ing the study per iod.  The  ana lyses  a r e  identical  in many 
a r e a s  and thus both a r e  p resen ted  together .  The rel iabil i ty al locations arid 
predic t ions  shown in this  sect ion a r e  based on the active port ions of a s i n g l e  
lunar shuttle mission,  i. e . ,  f r o m  s ta r tup  in ea r th  orbit  (Phase  F) to the 
cornpietion of cooldown in lunar orbi t  (Phase M)  and the s ta r tup  in lunar  
orbit  (Phase  0) to the completion of cooldown in ea r th  orbi t  (Phase  V ) .  The 
t imes  in ea r th  and lunar orbit  a r e  considered separately .  The FMEA's  
presented in Section 2. 3  a r e  applicable to both concepts with the following 
exceptions: 15. 06-04, P re -P res su r i za t ion  Quad Valve; 15. 06-08, Ground 
Pressur iza t ion  Valve; 15. 06- 10, Ground Pressur iza t ion  Disconnect; 15. 09- 0 7 ,  
Ground Fi l l  and Drain Valve; and 15.09-08, Ground F i l l  and Drain Disconnect 
a r e  only applicable to the Class  1 Hybrid RNS and I tem 15. 05-05 Blocking 
Valve is  only applicable to the Class  3 RNS. 
The reliabil i ty allocations for the two concepts a r e  given in Tables 2-  1 and 
2 - 2 ,  The reliabil i ty predictions a r e  given in two forms-with and without 
the inclusion of the ex te rna l  leakage fa i lure  mode. The leakage failure mode, 
while significant in t e r m s  of h i s tor ica l  fa i lure  ra te  data, i s  m o r e  conducive 
to elimination o r  reduction by design techniques . The dominant leakage 
failure mode in the RNS designs (external  leakage) can be reduced o r  e l imi-  
nated by providing multiple s ta t ic  sea l s  and /o r  welded connections. The 
reliability predictions without considering the ex te rna l  leakage a r e  given in 
Tables  2 - 3  and 2-4 and a r e  reported in the reliabil i ty d iagrams insec t ion  2. 5. 
The effect of ex te rna l  leakage, utilizing h is tor ica l  fa i lure  r a t e  data and 
cur ren t  designs (Saturn and Skylab), i s  shown in Tables 2-5 and 2-6. In 
a l l  cases ,  a single miss ion  reliabil i ty of 0. 995 was used for NERVA. F o r  
other sys tems  a s  noted, the allocations were  used a s  the reliabil i ty predic-  
tions in this analysis .  
The detail  rel iabil i ty predictions and cr i t ical i t ies  (the definitions of these 
t e r m s  a r e  given in Section 2. 2 )  a r e  presented in Sections 2. 4 and 2. 5) along 
with a ranking of the flight c r i t i ca l  i t ems .  The flight c r i t i ca l  i t em l is t  i s  
presented for the Class  1 Hybrid concept. The equivalent l is t  for the Class  3 
RNS would have seve ra l  changes-Items 15. 06-04, 15. 06-08, and 15. 09-07 
would be eliminated and I tem 15. 05- 05 would be added a s  I tem Number 11 
with a cr i t ical i ty  of 815 units. The cr i t ical i t ies  shown in Section 2. 5 
represen t  an RNS with one propellant module, one propulsion module, and 


Table 2 - 3  
RELIABILITY PREDICTION-CLASS 1 RNS (WITHOUT LEAKAGE) 
Sys t e m  System Totals C & C  Module I 
2. 0  Structure::: 1 0 .  9987  I 0 .  9 9 9 8  
3 .  0  Meteoroid. Protection 1 0 . 9 9 7 4  1 0 . 9 9 9 9 9 9  
5 .  0  Main Propulsion 
5 .  0  1 NERVA': 
5 .  05  Propellant Feed 
5 .  0  6  Pressur iza t ion  
5 .  0 9  Fill 
5 .  10 Ground. Vent 
5 .  11 Flight Vent 
0 .  9 9 3 6  
0 .  9950  
0 .  9 9 9 9 9 8  
NS F::: 
0 .  9 9 8 7 1  
0 .  99998  
NSF 
6. 0  Auxiliary Propulsion 1 0  9 7 2 1  0 .  9 7 2 2  
7 .  0  Astrionics 
7 .  0  1 Guid., Nav, and. Control 
7 .  0 4  Electr ical  Power 
7 .  05 Electr ical  Networks*: 
7 .  09 Data Management::: 
8 .  0  Safety':' 
:::The allocations were used as predictions for these systems 
':":'No single failur c 
Propellant Module 
0 .  9 9 9 9 9 8  
NS F 
0 .  9 9 9 9 9 4  
0 . 9 9 9 9 8  
NSF 
Propulsion Mod.ule 
0 . 9 9 3 7  
0 .  9950  
NSF 
NSF 
0 .  9 9 8 7 2  
- - 
NSF 
Table 2-4 
RELIABILITY PREDICTION--CLS*SS 3 RNS (VirJTHOUT L E A U G E )  
2. 0  Structure':' 
Sys tern Totals  C & C  Mod,ule / Prope l lan t  Module 
( l-  8-  1) 
0 . 9 9 8 7  0.  99996 
Propuls ion  Module 
3. 0  Meteoroid Pro tec t ion  I 0.  9950 10. 999999 1 0 . 9 9 9 3 9  1 0 . 9 9 9 9  
5.  0  Main Propuls ion 
5. 0  1 NERVA'? 
5 .  05 Propel lant  
5. 0 6  P re s su r i za t i on  
5 . 0 9  Fill 
5. 10 Ground. Vent 
5 .  1  1 Flight  Vent 
6. 0  Auxil iary Propuls ion  
7. 0  Astr ionics  
7. 0 1  Guid, Nav, and. Control  
7. 0 4  E lec t r i ca l  Power  
7. 05  E lec t r i ca l  Networks::: 
7. 09  Data Management':' 
0 .  9895 
0 .  9950 
0 .  99587 
NSF 
0. 99872 
0. 99998 
NSF:::::: 
0 .  9992  
- 
0.  99918 
NSF 
NSF 
0 . 9 9 9 9 8  
NSF 
0 . 9 9 3 7  
0. 9950 
NSF 
NSF 
0 .  99872  
I - 
1 NSF 
8. 0  Safety::' 
Tota ls  
'::The al locations w e r e  used a s  pred.ictions fo r  t he se  sy s t ems  
::::::No single fa i lu re  


one command and control module. Therefore ,  the cr i t ical i t ies  shown are 
for  the Class  1 Hybrid o r  the Class  3 Propulsion Module, Command and 
Control  Module and one Propellant Module. The Clas s 3 RNS contains eight 
propellant modules and they a r e  operative f o r  different lengths of t ime and 
during different operational phases .  These fac tors  have been considered in 
applying the cr i t ical i t ies  shown in Section 2. 5 in calculating the reliabil i ty 
predictions in Tables 2 - 4  and 2-6 .  
The resu l t s  indicate that the reliabil i ty goal of 0. 975 for  a single lunar 
shuttle miss ion  i s  possible.  If the ex te rna l  leakage problem i s  solved, the 
reliabil i ty predictions based on Saturn V fa i lure  ra te  data a r e  0. 958 and 0.  953  
for  the Class  1 Hybrid and the Class  3 RNS, respectively.  An improvement 
of approximately 50 percent  (a reduction of fa i lure  ra te  by a factor  of two) 
can be expected for 1975 s ta te  of the a r t .  This would give reliabil i ty predic-  
tions of 0. 979 and 0. 977 for  the two concepts. 
2 . 2  APPROACH 
2. 2. 1 Ground Rules and Assumptions 
The ground rules  and assumptions used in these analyses  a r e  presented below. 
The methodology used in  this  analysis  and summar ized  in Section 2.  2 .  2 is  
in accordance with the requirements  s e t  for th  in NASA MSFC Drawing 
No. 10M30111, Revision A, Procedure  for  Per forming  Systems Design 
Analysis.  
The fac tors  used in calculating the cr i t ical i ty  of an i t em a r e  based on s imi l a r  
Saturn S-IVB Stage and Skylab i t em values and engineering judgment. 
This repor t  gives an es t imate  on the probability of the RNS sat isfactor i ly  
performing i ts  function for  a given t ime under a given environment.  The 
reliabil i ty prediction analysis considers  only the mission portion of the 
operation cycle-the period of t ime  f r o m  the beginning of the t rans lunar  
injection burn (Phase F) in ea r th  orbi t  to the completion of the cooldown 
in lunar orbi t  injection burn (Phase  M) and the t ime f rom the beginning of 
the f i r s t  lunar burn (Phase  0) to the completion of the cooldown of the 
earth orbit injection burn (Phase V). The t imes  in ea r th  orbit (Phase W )  
and lunar orbit  (Phase N )  a r e  considered and discussed in the failure mode 
effects analysis.  
2 .  2 .  2 - Methodology 
2 .  2 ,  2 .  1 Fai lure  Mode Effects Analysis 
The F M E A  i s  a systematic  study of the effects of an independent single i tem 
failure on subsystem, system, and RNS performance with the pr imary  
purpose of identifying potential problem a r e a s .  The general method used in 
preparing the FMEA i s  to select a block f rom the applicable reliability 
diagram and establish it a s  an "item" to be analyzed in detail. The four 
basic  modes of fai lures  considered during determination and evaluation of 
the effects of a given failure a r e :  
A.  P rematu re  operation of an i tem. 
3. Fai lure  of an i tem to operate a t  prescr ibed time. 
C. Fai lure  of an i tem during operation. 
D, Fa i lure  of an i tem to cease operation a t  a prescr ibed t ime.  
Each block is evaluated for the failure modes that a r e  applicable. Descrip- 
tions of failure types such a s  "Leakage at  connections, " "Output when not 
required, " o r  "No output when required, " may be used to cover the failure 
effect analysis of seve ra l  failure modes.  
Format  
The FMEA i s  presented in a format  arranged in columns and headings so  the 
effect oC a given failure can be studied by reading f rom left to right. F o r  
each i tem the applicable failure is  indicated and the effect of this failure on 
the subsystem, RNS, and mission a r e  identified. 
ihfission t ime periods a r e  identified in the "Phase" column with capital le t ters  
F: 6, H, I, J, K, etc.  The f i r s t ,  o r  lefthand, le t ter  indicates the phase in 
which the failure occurs;  the second let ter  indicates the phase in which the 
effect of the failure i s  being evaluated. For  example, the le t ters  "F" and 
"G" (FG) indicate consideration of the failure a s  having occurred in Phase "F" 
and the evaluation of the effect on the RNS and mission during Phase "6." If 
only one le t ter  is  used, it signifies the phase in which the failure occurs .  
Evaluation of Effects 
The entry which appears  in the column concerning effects of the given failure 
conveys (1) a loss statement,  and (2) the supporting words.  The loss  s ta te-  
ment reflects the evaluation of the failure effect, and the supporting words 
provide the rationale for the statement.  The effects of each single failure 
a r e  classified into one of four groups a s  shown in the following table: 
Effect of Single Item Fai lure  
Actual Loss 
Probable Loss 
Possible Loss 
None 
Probability of Loss ( P )  
p = 100% 
loyo< p < 100% 
O % <  p <_ 10% 
p = 0% 
The word "None" a s  used above does not mean there i s  no effect. It means 
the probability of loss  f rom the failure has  been evaluated to be zero.  
Calculating Procedure 
Figure 2-  1 i l lustrates  the G-323 computer program calculating procedure 
f o r  RNS loss  probability of an i tem with respect  to a designated failure 
mode over a number of mission phases.  The procedure accounts for ea r l i e r  
phase fai lures  contributing to RNS 10s s probability during the ea r l i e r  phase 
and also to the RNS loss probability for la te r  phases.  
This accounting is  accomplished through double subscripted P factors ,  6 .  .. 
1J 
The "i" identified the phase when the failure is  considered to have occurred, 
and the "j"  identified the phase when the RNS 10s s i s  being considered. 
POWERED 
DARK BORDERS ARE ADDED WITHIN 
""HAS A FAILURE OCCURRED IN 
PHASE TIME IN HOURS 
Figure 2-9 PROPAGATION OF LOSS PRUBABILPTXES 
The  K.t. cu A product  approx imates  the fa i lu re  probabi l i ty  of a n  i t e m  i n  a 
1 1  
designated fa i lu re  mode dur ing the  "ith" phase .  Th i s  re la t ionship  is based 
on the exponential d is t r ibut ion and the approximat ion:  probabil i ty of no 
fa i lu re  = - ~ . t . a A -  1 - K.t.akwhich applies when the fa i lu re  probabil i ty 
e 1 1  1 1  
K.t . f fk  i s  smal l .  A propor t ion of th i s  f a i lu re  probabi l i ty  equal  t o  P. contr i -  
1 1  1  i
butes  d i r ec t l y  t o  RNS lo s s  probabi l i ty  during the "ith" phase  when fa i lure  
occu r s  and a remaining propor t ion ( 1 - P . . )  i s  c a r r i e d  ove r  t o  the next phase, 
L 1  
If RNS lo s s  does not occu r  in the next phase  a s  a resu l t  of the "ith" phase 
fa i lure ,  a  propor t ion of the yet remaining fa i lu re  probabi l i ty  equal  t o  (1-p..  P 
L1 
(1-Pi2 i s  c a r r i e d  ove r  t o  the  next succeeding phase.  This  p r o c e s s  con- 
t inues  in  a s t ep  wise  m a n n e r  t o  the l a s t  m i s s i o n  phase. The fo rmula  fo r  RNS 
l o s s  probabi l i ty  assoc ia ted  with phase  F, G, H, I, J, e tc . ,  developed f o r  a 
s ingle  fa i lu re  mode,  can  be  wr i t t en  f o r  any gene ra l  phase  P a s  follows: 
P- 1 
U = C  K t  a h  
i  = in i t ia l  
m i s s ion  
phase  
T o  obtain to ta l  RNS l o s s  probabil i ty fo r  an  i t e m  dur ing a phase,  a summation 
over  a l l  f a i lu re  modes  i s  pe r fo rmed .  This  RNS l o s s  probabi l i ty  f o r  the item 
i s  then given a s  fol lows: 
RNS Loss  Probabil i ty(Item considered)  = 1 C U 
A l l M i s s i o n  Fa i l u r e  
Pha  s e  s  Modes 
Ranking 
Ranking provides  a convenient compar i son  of a l l  F C I  a s  to t he i r  r espec t ive  
contribution toward RNS lo s s .  In th i s  compar i son  i t  i s  m o r e  impor tan t  t o  
t r e a t  the c r i t i ca l i ty  number  a s  an index of re la t ive  impor tance  r a t h e r  than 
a n  ac tua l  quanti tat ive value. With the identi ty and re la t ive  impor tance  of 
the  i t e m s  in the foreground,  the c r i t i ca l i ty  ranking can be used a s  an  aid in  
de te rmin ing  whe re  t o  concentra te  e f fo r t s  toward reduction of RNS lo s s  
probabil i ty.  
Because  ranking i s  based on a s ing le - fa i lu re  effect  ana lys i s  i t  should not be 
used a s  the sole  guide f o r  des ign improvement  e f fo r t s .  The re  m a y  be parts 
designed into the RNS with redundancy and these  p a r t s ,  because  of ennbryonic 
design o r  newness  of the  s ta te -o f - the -a r t ,  have a probabi l i ty  of mult iple 
failures a s  high a s  the probabil i ty of single fa i lu re  of an  FCI. These  redun- 
dant  p a r t s  do not appear  on the s ingle-fa i lure  F C I  l i s t .  
2 .  2. 3 Glossa ry  of T e r m s  and Symbols 
Definition of t e r m s  and symbols  used i n  the  FMEA a r e  l i s ted  below. 
Conditional Probabi l i ty  of RNS Loss  ( P )-The conditional probabil i ty of RNS 
l o s s  given that  a  fa i lu re  in  the des ignated fa i lu re  mode h a s  occur red .  
Criticality-That port ion of unreliabil i ty,  a ssoc ia ted  with fa i lure  of a flight 
- 
c r i t i c a l  i t em,  leading t o  RNS lo s s .  
Cr i t ica i i ty  Number-The RNS 10s s  r a t e  resul t ing f r o m  the fa i lu re  su s  cepti-  
-- 
b i l i v  ol  an  i t e m  exp re s sed  a s  the  number  of RNS l o s s e s  pe r  mil l ion mi s s ions .  
Cr i t ica l i ty  Ranking-The ranking of i t e m s  in dec r ea s ing  o r d e r  of the  i t e m  
c r i t i ca l i ty  number .  
Environmental  Adjustment Fac to r  (k)-A fac to r  by  which a given gener ic  
- 
fa i lu re  r a t e  i s  mult ipl ied t o  obtain a resu l t ing  ra te  which re f lec t s  the m i s -  
sion phase  environment.  
Failure-A cessa t ion  of abil i ty t o  p e r f o r m  a specif ied function o r  functions 
within previously  es tabl ished l im i t s  on the  a r e a  of i n t e r e s t .  This  r equ i r e s  
that l imi t s  be es tabl ished to  define sa t i s fac to ry  per fo rmance  of 
the function. 
Fa i l u r e  Mode-One of four  c l a s s e s  o r  groups  into which the fa i lu re  of i t e m s  
may be divided f o r  analyt ica l  purposes .  These  four  fa i lu re  modes  a r e :  
( 1 1  p r e m a t u r e  operat ion of a n  i t em,  ( 2 )  f a i lu re  of a n  i t e m  to opera te  a t  
p r e sc r i bed  t imes ,  ( 3 )  fa i lu re  of an i t e m  dur ing  operation,  and (4)  fa i lu re  
of an i tern to  cease  operation a t  a  p r e sc r i bed  t ime .  
Fa i l u r e  Mode Frequency  Fac to r  (Q)-The expected propor t ion of the  to ta l  
f a i l u r e s  of an i t e m  chargeable  to  the des ignated fa i lu re  mode.  
F a i l u r e  Probabil i ty-Probabil i ty - -  t ha t  a n  i t e m  wil l  not o p e r a t e  a s  r equ i red  
for a speci f ied  nlis s ion  t i m e  a.nd m i s s i o n  opera t ing  environment; the i nhe ren t  
iteern umrelia.bility f o r  the  m i s s i o n  in tended,  
F a i l u r e  Type-A g e n e r a l  class o r  group into which the  f a i l u r e s  of s o m e  i t e m s  
may be divided for amalytica! p u r p o s e s .  
F l ight  C r i t i c a l  I t em (FC1)-A flight c r i t i c a l  i t e m  d e s c r i b e s  the  functional  
e l e m e n t  f o r  which the  por t ion  of unre l iabi l i ty  a s soc ia ted  with l o s s  of the  RNS 
d u r i n g  the  m i s s i o n  can be  t r a c e d  t o  e i t h e r :  
1. The  f a i l u r e  of a  s ingle  identif iable p iece  of h a r d w a r e ,  such  a s  
a  r e l a y  o r  valve. 
2.  The f a i l u r e  i n  the  functioning of a group of components  and 
p a r t s ,  such  a s  s u b s y s t e m  wi r ing  o r  piping. 
G e n e r i c  F a i l u r e  Rate  (A)-Number of f a i l u r e s  cha rgeab le  t o  the  inheren t  
unre l iabi l i ty  p e r  unit- t ime,  cyc les ,  o r  t r i a l s ,  under  l a b o r a t o r y  condit ions 
( u n s t r e s s e d -  r o o m  ambien t ) .  
Redundancy-The ex i s t ence  of m o r e  t h a n  one m e a n s  of accompl ishing a given 
t a sk ,  w h e r e  a l l  of t h e s e  m e a n s  m u s t  f a i l  be fo re  t h e r e  i s  a n  o v e r a l l  f a i l u r e  
of the  s y s t e m .  
Reliability-The probabi l i ty  of a n  item p e r f o r m i n g  i t s  function f o r  the  t i m e  
r e q u i r e d  under  the  env i ronment  speci f ied  ( s e e  a l s o  RNS Reliabil i ty) .  
RNS Reliabil i ty-Probabil i ty tha t  RNS l o s s  wi l l  not occur .  
2 - 3  FAILURE MODE E F F E C T S  ANALYSIS 
T h i s  sec t ion  conta ins  the  individual  F M E A  w o r k  s h e e t s .  The s y s t e m s  
analyzed a r e  shown i n  F i g u r e s  2-2, 2 - 3  and 2-4 .  F i g u r e  2-  2 i s  the  C l a s s  1 
Hybrid propuls ion  s y s t e m ,  F i g u r e  2-3  i s  the  C l a s s  3  propuls ion  s y s t e m  and 
F i g u r e  2 -4  i s  the  aux i l i a ry  propuls ion  s y s t e m  which i s  common t o  both con-  
cepts .  T h e s e  s y s t e m  s c h e m a t i c s  r e f l ec t  the  c u r r e n t  des ign  definition. 
I 
I 
PROPULSION MODULE 
1 PRESSURIZATION PROPELLANT MODULE 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
COOL DOWN flBYPASS , 
PROPULSION MODULE 
PRESSURIZATION 
CONTROL 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
06-03 I I 
I 
I PROPULSION SYSTEM 
I 
, SCHEMATIC 
CLASS I RNS 
FIG. 2.: t 
RUN TANK (SAME AS C L A S S  I) 
OG-OG 
1 5 . x x - x x  f PROPELLANT MODULE (TY 
- - 

FOR A~L  ROLL CONTROL ROLL CONTROL YAW CONTROL YAW CONTROL PITCH CONTROL PITCH CONTROL THRUST CONTROL THRUST CONTROL THRUST CONTROL THRUST CONTROL PROPELLANT 
NOZZLES LEFT RIGHT LEFT RIGHT LEFT RIGHT AFT AFT FORWARD FORWARD SETTLING 
GOX ACCUMULATOR li 
b THRUST CONTROL THRUST CONTROL PROPELLANT 
j FORWARD FORWARD SETTLING 
4 
A U X I L I A R Y  PROPULSION 
SYSTEM 
FIG. Z-Lt  
These  s y s t e m s  and the a s t r i on i c s  s y s t e m  a r e  de sc r i bed  in  Volume 11, P a r t s  
A and B. All of the  FMEA a r e  applicable t o  both concepts except  i t e m s :  
15. 06. 04 P rep re s su r i z a t i on  Valve (Quad) 
15. 06. 08 Ground P re s su r i z a t i on  Valve 
15.06. 10 Ground P r e s s u r i z a t i o n  Disconnect  
15.09. 07 Ground Fill and Dra in  Valve 
15.09.08 Ground F i l l  and Dra in  Disconnect  
The numbering s y s t e m  used in  th i s  ana lys i s  and the  t e s t  r equ i r emen t s  task 
follows the  numbering s y s t e m  se t  up fo r  the  weight repor t ing in  the Guidelines 
and Cons t ra in t s  Document, except  an  addit ional  number  w a s  added-the f i r s t  
digit  r e f e r s  t o  the module which contains the component. The number  1 was  
used fo r  the  propel lant  module, 2 i s  used f o r  propulsion module components,  
and the  p re f ix  3 is used fo r  the  command and control  module.  Thus,  com-  
ponent 15. 05. 04 i s  on the propel lant  module ( I ) ,  i s  p a r t  of t he  propulsion 
s y s t e m  (5), i s  p a r t  of the p r e s su r i z a t i on  subsys t em (05), and i s  the fourth 
component analyzed (04). 
This  numbering s y s t e m  appl ies  to  both concepts and i s  graphical ly  i l lus t ra ted  
i n  the  re l iabi l i ty  d i a g r a m s  i n  Section 2. 5 along with the  re l iabi l i ty  al location 
and predic t ion f o r  e ach  subsystem,  sys tem,  module and the complete RNS, 
The FMEA shee t s  a r e  placed i n  the  numer i ca l  o r d e r  of the  components 
analyzed.  







RELIABILITY FAILURE EFFECT ANALYSIS F .  
G 
MISSION: LUNAR SHUTTLE 
CLASS: 1-HYBRID 
MODULE: PROPELLANT H .  
SYSTEM: PRESSURIZATION I 
ITEM FUNCTION 
15.06-04 
QUAD VALVES (1 s e t ) ,  
PREPRESS, GH2 
CONTROL. FLOW OF GH2 
TO PROPELLANT 14ODULF 
FROM NJ3RTJA ENGINE 
BIA PROPULSION MODULE 
PRESS DUCTING ( 2 5 . 0 6 - 0 4 )  
DURING PREPRESSURIZATION 
OF PROPELLANT MODULE. 
TRANSLUNAR INJECTION J 0 APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 
PULSED AFTERCOOLING K PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
Ml°COURSE CORRECTION-tDLE 
L e CIRCULARIZE A T  TARGET ALTITUDE TRANSLUNAR COAST 
tNSERTlON INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT AFTERCOOLING 
PULSED AFTERCOOLING N LUNAR ORBIT OPERATIONS 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
FAILURE TYPEIMODE SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
1. FAILURE TO OPEN 
2 .  FAILURE TO R m I N  
OPEN 
3. FAILURE TO C K S E  
4. FAILURE TO REMAIN 
CLOSED. 
5 .  LEAKAGE 
NONE 
THE QUAE VALVE SET 
CONTAINS Dl0 SUBSETS 
OF VALVES I N  S E R I E S  AND 
PARAILEL TO EACH OTHER 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
A B I L I T Y  TO CONTROL ULLAGE 
PRFSSURE MAY B E  LOST,  
RESULTING I N  I N A B I L I T Y  TO 
TRANSFER PROPELLANT TO 
P R O W L S I O N  MODULE. LOSS 
O F  S U F F I C I E N T  M 2  COULD 
CAUSE I N A B I L I T Y  TO PERFORM 
ENGINE COOLDO~?N. 
0 r INSERTION INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT 
P PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
0 e APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 
R PULSEO AFTERCOOLING 
S . TRANSEARTU INJECTION 
PHASE FAILURE EFFECT ON RNS 
NONE 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
THRUST C A P A B I L n Y  MAY BE 
LOST. I N A B I L I T Y  TO PERFORM 
ADEQUATE PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
DURING COAST PHASES 
COULD RESULT I N  ENGINE 
DESTRUCTION. 
PDSSIBLE LOSS 
I N A B I L I T Y  TO MAINTAIN 
LH2 I N  PROPELLANT 
MODULF 



F a TRANSLUNAR INJECTION J . APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 0 a INSERTION INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT T PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
iELIABILITY FAILURE EFFECT ANALYSIS P PULSED AFTERCOOLING MIDCOURSE CORRECTION-IDLE MODE G PULSED AFTERCOOLING K PULSED AFTERCOOLING TRANSEARTH COAST 
MISSION: LUNAR SHUTTLE M'DCOURSE L e CIRCULARIZE AT TARGET ALTITUDE 0 e APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE TRANSLUNAR COAST U e EARTH ORBIT CAPTURE 
CLASS: 1-HYBRID ti e INSERTION INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT PULSED AFTERCOOL'NG R PULSED AFTERMOLING V PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
MODULE: PROPEW I PULSED AFTERCOOLING N LUNAR ORBlT WERATIONS S . TRANSEARTH INJECTION W ORBIT RESUPPLY AND C/O OPERATIONS 
SYSTEM: FRESSURIZATION FAILURE EFFECT ON FAILURE EFFECT ON 
GROUND FILL CONNECT M2 GROUND 
ISCONNECT IS IN SERDS 
FROPELL4NT MODULE ITH -07 GROUND FII;L VALVE 
PRESSURIZATION SYSTE3f 
(PRESSURIZATION) 



TRANSLUNAR INKCTION J . APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 
PULSED AFTERCOOLING K PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
MIDCOURSE CDRRECT'ON-'DLE L CIRCULARIZE A T  TARGET ALTITUDE 
TRANSLUNAR COAST 
INSERTKW INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
PULSED AFTERCOOLING N LUNAR ORBIT OPERATIONS 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
FAILURE TYPEIMODE SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
1. FAILURE TO OPEN 
2. FAILURE TO CLOSE 
3. LEAKAGE 
THE QUAD VALVE SET 
CONTAINS TWO SUBSETS 
PAlWUL TO EACH 
SIBLF: LOSS 
LITY TO CONTROL W G E  
SSURE MAY BE M S T ,  
ULTING I N  INABILITY 
TRANSFER PROPELLANT 
0 PROPULSION MODULE. 
S OF SUFFICIENT LH2 
ULD CAUSE INABILITY TO 
WORM r n G I N E  COOLDCVN. 
0 . INSERTION INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBlT T PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
P PULSED AFTERCOOLING MIDCOURSE CORRECTION-IDLE MODE TRANSEARTH COAST 
0 . APOLUNEPLANECHANGE 
U e EARTH ORBIT CAPTURE 
R PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
V PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
S . TRANSEARTH INJECTION W ORBIT RESUWLY AND C/O W E R A T I W S  
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
PHASE FAILURE EFFECT ON RNS MISSION OR SPACECRAFT 











RELIABILITY FAILURE EFFECT ANALYSIS F e TRANSLUNAR INJECTION J 0 APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 
G PULSED AFTERCOOLING K PULSED AFTERCOOLING P PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
MISSION: LUNAR SHUTTLE TRANSLUNAR MIDCOURSE CORRECT'ON-'DLE COAST L . CIRCULARIZE AT TARGET ALTITUDE Q . APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 
CLASS: 1-HYBRID H a INSERTION INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT AFTERCOOLING R PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
I PULSED AFTERCOOLING S e TRANSEARTH INJECTION 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
RNS MAY NOT BE 
AVAILABLE FOR MISSION 


F o TRANSLUNAR INJECTION J s APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 0 B INSERTION INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT T PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
RELIABILITY FAI1.URE EFFECT ANAI-YSIS 
G PULSED AFTERCOOLING K PULSED AFTERCOOLING P PULSED AFTERCOOLIHG 
MIDCOURSE CORRECTION-IOLC MODE 
TRANSEARTH COAST 
M I S I O M :  LUNAR S H U n L E  M1oCGURSE CGRRECTIGN-'DLE L m CIRLULARILS A T  TARGET ALTITUDE 0 e APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE TRANSLUNAR COAST U e €ART)-! ORBIT CAPTURE 
CLASS: I-HYBRID H F IN55RTlO.N lNTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR OR81T AFTERCoGLING 9 P U L E D  +FTERCOOLlNF V PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
MODULE: PROPULSION I PULSED AFTERCOOLING N LUNAR ORBIT OPERATIONS S e TRANSEARTH INJECTION W ORBIT RESUPPLY A N D  C/O OPERATION SYSTEM: PROPELLANT FEED FAILURE EFFECT ON FAILURE EFFECT ON 
. FAILURE TO START ONE - EACH PUMP I S  SIZED NONE - REDUNDANCY I S  
PROPULSION MODULE . FAILURE TO OR FULL SYSTEM CHILLDObm CAPACITY PROVIDZD EPI EITHER P W  
TO THE STAGE FEED DELIVER A S  REQUIRED 
AND NERVA ENGINE 
FEED DUCTTNG DURING 
PRESTART CHILLDOWN 
O F  BOTH PROPELLQT 
FEED SYSTEMS. 


RELIABILITY FAILURE EFFECT ANALYSIS F .  
G 
MISSION: LUNAR SHUTTLE 
CLASS: 1 - H Y B R D  
MODULE: F'ROPlJSION H * 
SYSTEM: PROPELLAWI FEED I 
CHECK VALVE, LH2, M C R  W C K  VALVE E3OVTDES 
C H I L L  SYSTEM UNIDIRECTIONAL FLOW TO 
NERVA ENGINE THE INLET DUCTING OF EACH 
FEED DUCTING ( 2 )  NERVA TURBO-PUMP DURING 
CHILLDOPiN. 
TRANSLUNAR INJECTION J e APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 
PULSED AFTERCOOLING K PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
MIDCOURSE C0RRECT~0N-~0LEh40DE L e CIRCULARIZE A T  TARGET ALTITUDE TRANSLUNAR COAST 
INSERTION tNTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
PULSED AFTERCOOLING N LUNAR ORBIT OPERATIONS 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
FAILURE TYPEIMODE SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
1. FAILURE TO O W N  PARTIAL LOSS 
ABILITY TO ACCGG'LISH 
CHILLDOWN OF THE NERVA 
ENGINE FEED DUCTING I S  
LOST AM) COULD RESULT I N  
CAVITATION OF THE NERVA 
T ~ B O P W P ( S )  DURING TKE 
POWER PHASES 
2 .  FAILURE TO CLOSE PARTIAL LOSS I ADQUATE LH, CONDITIONING 3. LEAKAGE OF THE N E R V ~  ENGINE FEED I I DUCTING MAY NOT B E  ATTAINED, 
RESULTING I N  NERVA TURBO- 
PU!IP(S) CAVITATION DURING THE 
P O b m  PHASES. 
0 8 INSERTION INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT 
P PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
0 0 APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 
R PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
S e TRANSEARTH INJECTION 
HASE FAILURE EFFECT ON RNS 
LH2 PUMP CAVITATION 
Q 
PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
MIDCOURSE CORRECTION-IDLE W O E  
TRANSEARTH COAST 
PROBABLE LOSS 
POSSIBLE LOSS 

F e TRANSLUNAR INJECTION J I APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 
RELIABILITY FAILURE EFFECT ANALYSIS G PULSED AFTERCOOLING K PULSED AFTERCOOLING P PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
MISSION: LUNAR SHUnLE 
CLASS: 1-HYBRID R PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
I PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
S e TRANSEARTH INJECTION 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
TO A C C W L I S H  CHILLDOVlN 
CHILLDOWN OF STAGE 
AND NERVA ENGINE 
FEED DUCTING 
MENT OF REQUIRED LH 
mw RATE AND CAUSE*A 
DEGRADATION OF STAGE 
THRUST. 








I RELIABiLITY FAILURE EFFECT AMR'YSIS F * TRANSLUNAR INJECTION G PULSED AFTERCOOLING J e APOLUNE PLANE CUANGE K PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
R(lDCOURSE CoRPIECT1ON-lDLE L o ClRCULARiZE A T  TARGET ALTITUDE TRANSLUNAR COAST 
H e INSERTION INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT #A AFTERCooLING 
I PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
N LUNAR ORBIT WERATIONS 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
SAhE EFFECT AS MODE 4, 
"FAILURF: TO REMAIN CLOSED." 
DUP,ING EARTH ORBIT 
OPERATIONS, THE "FAILURE 
TO RFSlAIN CLOSED" AND 
"LEAKAGE" MODES COULD 
DEGRADE LH TRANSFER 
OPERATIONS? MODES 1, 2 
AND 3 DO NOT &PLY DURING 
EARTH ORBIT. 
0 rr INSERTION INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT 
P PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
C1 e APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 
R PULSED ArTERCOOLlFJC 
S m TRANSEARTH INJECTION 
PHASE FAILURE EFFECT ON RNS 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
LH, SUPPLY DEPLETION COULD 
C A ~ E  NERVA P W  CAVITA- 
T I O N  DURING PHASES. 
INADEQUATE PULSED AFTER: 
COOLING DURING MISSION 
COAST PHASES COULD RESULT I N  
ENGINE DESTRUrnION. 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
I N A B I L I T Y  TO ,HAINTAIN 
IJ$ I N  P R O P r n I O N  MODULE. 
# 1, 8 a B a 2 WE, 
3WE 
'El$ 
k2 2 
8
8
w
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RELIABILITY FAILURE EFFECT ANALYSIS F * 
--- G 
MISSION LUNAR SWUnLE 
CLASS I-EYBRD 
MODULE I I I O p ~ I O P , '  H *  
t 
PROPELLANT TO THE PITCH 
PITCH CONTROL CONTROL ENGINES, - 2 0  AND 
TRANSLUNWA INJECTION J 6 APOLUNE PLANE CHAt4GE 
PULSED AFTERCOOLING K PlJLSED AFTERGOOLINE 
MIDCouRSE CORRECT'ON-'oLE "" L e CIRCULARIZE AT TARGET ALTlTUBE TRANSLUNAR COAST 
INSERT ION l N i O  ELLiPi lCAL L b i i b R  ORBiT AFTERGOQL'NG 
PULSED AFTERCOOLING F? LU?!WR ORSIT OPERATIONS 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
FAILURE TYPEIMODE SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
C a IfdSERTlON IMTO ELLIPTICAL LUMilR ORBIT T 
P PULSE0 AFTCRmOLl* 
D m APOLUNE PLAhdE CHAP960 
ti a; 
R PULSED WFTERCDQLIFIG v 
S m TRANSEARTH I-CTIW ... 
PHASE FAILURE EFFECT QN RNS 
1. FAILURE TO OPEN 
2. FAILURE TO 
rnfiAIN o m  
3. FAILURE TO CLOSE 
4. FAILURE TO 
REMAIN CLOSED 
5. LEAKAGE 
NONE 
EACH QUAD VALVE S E T  
(-18 -19) CONTAINS 
TWO SUBSETS OF VALVES 
I N  S E R I E S  AND PARALLEL 
TO EACH OTHER. 
POSSIBLE LO5S 
A B I L I T Y  TO PROYIDE 
SUFFICIENT GASEOUS 
HYDROGEN TO APS 
P I T C H  CONTROL ENGINES 
COULD BE DEGRADED. 
NONE 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
LOSS OF RNS P I T C H  
CONTROL D U R m  EARTH 
ORBIT OPERATIONS (PHASE W) . 
EVEN THO= APS PROPELLAh'l' 
I S  STORED DURING INSERTION 
I N T O  EARTH ORBIT (PHASE U) ,  
QUAD VALVE LEXAGE 
I CANNOT OCCUR UNTIL MISSION PHASE W WHEN THE UPSTREAM APS CONTROL VALVE ( - 1 2  or -13) IS C W W i D E D  
om. 
PULSED AFTERCOBLING 
U I W U R S E  COBBEGTIOH-IDLE W O t  
TR-ARTW COAST 
EARTH ORBIT CACrlURC 
P U m D  AFTERGBOLEPIG 
OBDlT R i S J W L Y  AND C/O m R A T I W  
POSSIBLE LOSS 
RNS MAY NOT 
BE AVAILABLE 
FOR M I S S I O N  
RELIABILITY FAILURE EFFECT ANALYSIS 
MISSION: LUNAR SHUTTLE 
CLASS: 1-HYBRID 
MODULE: PROPULSION 
SYSTEM: A P S  
PROPELLANT TO THE YAW 
A P S  YAW AND AND ROLL CONTROL 
ROLL CONTROL ENGINES , -16, -17, -24 
TRANSLUNAR INJECTION J 0 APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 
PULSED AFTERCOOLING K PULSE0 AFTERCOOLING 
MIDCOURSE CORRECT'ON-IDLE L . CIRCULARIZE AT TARGET ALTITUDE TRANSLUNAR COAST 
INSERTION INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT AFTERCOOLING 
PULSED AFTERCOOLING N LUNAR ORBIT OPERATIONS 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
FAILURE TYPEIMOOE SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
1. FAILURE TO OPEN 
2 .  FAILURE TO 
REHAIN OPEN 
3. FAILURE TO CLOSE 
4. FAILURE TO 
REMAIN CLOSED 
5. LEAKAGE 
NONE 
EACH QUAD VALVE S E T  (-14, -15, -22 and - 2 3 )  
CONTAINS TWO SUBSETS 
OF VALVES I N  S E R I E S  AND 
PARALLEL TO EACH OTHER 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
A B I L I T Y  TO PROVIDE 
SUFFICIENT GASEOUS 
HYDROGEN TO AFS YAW 
AND ROLL CONTROL ENGINES 
COEWI BE DEGRADED. 
0 8 INSERTION INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT T 
P PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
0 . APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 
U .  
R PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
v 
S e TRANSEARTH INJECTION 
W 
FAILURE EFFECT ON RNS 
NONE 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
LOSS OF RNS YAW AND 
ROLL CONTROL DURING 
EARTH ORBIT OPERATIONS 
(PHASE W) . EVEN THOUGH 
APS PROPELLANT I S  
STORED DURING INSERTION 
INTO EARTH ORBIT (PHASE U ) ,  
Q,UAD VALVE LEAKAGE 
CANNOT OCCUR UNTIL 
MISSION PHASE W WHEN THE 
U P S T W  APS CONTROL 
VALVE ( - 1 2  OR - 1 3 )  I S  COMMANDED 
OPEN. 
ION-IDLE MODE 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
RNS MAY NOT BE 
AVAILABLE FOR 





ELIABILITY FAILURE EFFECT ANALYSIS F e TRANSLUNAR INJECTION J * APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 
G PULSED AFTERCOOLING K PULSED AFTERCOOLING P PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
MIS%ION: LUNAR SHUTTLE MIDCOURSE CORRECTION-IDLE L a CIRCULARIZE AT TARGET ALTITUDE 0 APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE TRANSLUNAR COAST 
CLASS: 1 - HYBRID 
H . 1NSERTION INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT PULSED AFTERCOOLING R PULSED AFTERCOOLING MODULE: COIWAND AND CONTROL 
I PULSED AFTERCOOLING S e TRANSEARTH INJECTION 
NORMALLY CLOSED SOLENOID 1. FAILURE TO OPEN 
VALVES, NORMALLY REDUNDANCY I S  PROVIDED 
REDUNDANT VALVES 
OXIDIZER S I D E  O F  THE 
ENGINE SUaSYSTEM 
TRANSEARTH COAST 
EARTH ORBIT CAPTURE 
PULSEO AFTERCOOLING 
ORBIT RESUPPLY AND C/O OPERATIONS 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
MISSION OR SPACECRAFT 
NONE 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
- 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
RNS MAY NOT BE 
AVAILABLE FOR MISSION 
G PULSED AFTERCOOLING K PULSED AFTERCOOLING P PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
MISSION: LUNAR SHUTTLE 
MIDCOuRsE L CIRCULARIZE AT TARGET ALTITUDE Q APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 
TRANSLUNAR COAST 
CLASS: 1 -  RID R PULSED AFTERCOOLING H INSERTION INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
MODULE: CCMMAND AND CONTROL N LUNAR ORBIT OPERATIONS S TRANSEARTH INJECTION I PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
SYSTEM: AUXILIARY PROPUISION FAILURE EFFECT ON 
8 
PHASE 
F 
G 
H 
I 
J 
K 
L 
M 
0 
P 
'a 
R 
S 
T 
U 
v 
W 
F 
G 
H 
I 
J 
K 
L 
M 
0 
P 
Q 
R 
S 
T 
U 
v 
W 
SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
NONE 
EACH ENGINE S U P S Y S W  CONTAINS 
REDUNDANT VALVES 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
DEPLETION OF APS OXIDIZER SUPPLY 
FAILURE EFFECT ON RNS 
NONE 
REDUNDANCY I S  PROVIDED 
POSSIBLE IOSS 
IXlSS OF AmITUDE CONTROL 
WSSIBLE LOSS 
LOSS OF ATTITUDE CONTROL 
DURING EARTH ORBIT OPERATIONS 
FAILURE TYPEIMOOE 
1. FAILURE TO OPEN 
2. FAILURE TO CLOSE 
3. UAKAGE 
ITEM 
36.01.01-06 
ENGINE COEl'ROL 
VALVES, NORMALLY 
CIOSED, GO2 ( 2 0 )  
FUNCTION 
NORMALLY CLOSED SOLENOID 
VALVES WHICH DIRECT THE 
G02 FXOM THE REGULATORS TO 
THE OXIDIZER SIDE OF THE 
ENGINE SUBSYSTEM 





FORM 830-375 
U * EARTH ORBIT CAPTURE 
V PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
FILL VALVE USED TO 
GROW FILL REPLENISH C;H2 
SUPPLY DURING GROUND FILL DURING GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY 
RIBIIN CLOSED VALVE IS  IN SERIES WITH RFDUNDANCY I S  PROVIDED 
36.01.02-05 CHECX DISCONNECT 
POSSIBLE LOSS DOSSIBLE LOSS 
DEPLETION OF APS 
FUEL SUPPLY 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
RNS MAY NOT BE 





FI%BIABIEIPY FAILURE E F F E C T  ANALYSIS F s TRANSLUNAR INJECTION J - APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 
G PULSED AFIERCOOLING K PULSED AFTERCOOLINE 
N I I S l O N :  LUNAR SWUWLE MIDCOURSE CoRRECT'ON-'oLE L S CIRCULARIZE A T  TARGET ALTITUDE TRANSLUNAR COAST CLASS: 1 - IIYBRm 
MODULE: COM-illND AID COIYTROL H e INSERTION INTO ELLfPTlCAL LUNAR ORBIT PULSED AFTERCOOLiNG 
I PULSED AFTERCOOLING N LUNAR ORBlT OPERATIONS AUXILIARY PROPUESION 
NORMALLY OPEN SOLENOID 1. FAILURE TO O P E 3  
VALVE DIVERTS FLOW FROM VALVE I S  I N  PARALLEL TO 
GHZ REGULATOR(S ) TO 36. 01. 0: 36.m.02-19 VALVE 
-14 HEAT EXCHANGER 
VALVE I S  I N  S E R I E S  TO 
36 .@1.04-14 VALVE 
P O S S I B L E  M S S  
DEPLETION O F  A P S  FUEL SUPPLY 
O o INSERTION INTO ELLIFTICAL LUNAR ORBIT T PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
P PULSED AFTkRCOOLING MIOCOUASE CORRECTION-IDLE MODE TRANSEARTH COAST 
Cl D APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 
F! PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
S a TRANSEARTH INJECTION 
PHASE FAILURE EFFECT ON RNS 
REDUNDANCY I S  PROVmED 
M S S  O F  ATTITUDE CONTROL 
DURING EARTH OXBIT OPERATIONS 
EARTI-! ORBIT CAPTURE 
PULSEO AFTERCOOLING 
ORBlT RESUPPLY AND C/O OPERATIONS 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
MISSION OR SPACECRAFT 
NONE 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
RNS MAY NOT BE 
AVAILABLE FOR M I S S I O N  

F 0 
RELIABILITY FAILURE EFFECT ANALYSIS 
MISSION: LUNAR S H U V b E  
CLASS: 1 - ii"iERLD 
MODULE: CO?WIAMD AivD COi'iTROL u s  
SYSTEM: AUXILVLRY PROPULSION I 
NOH4ALLY CLOSED SOLENOID 
VALVE CONTROLS GO2 FLOt7 
TO HEAT EXCHANGER 
TRANSLUNAR INJECTION J s APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 
PULSED AFIERCOOLING K PULSED AFTI-RLTOLING 
MIDCoURSE CoRRECTIQP.I-lDLE RiOBE L B CIRCULARIZE AT TARGET ALTITUDE 
TRANSLUNAR COAST 
INSERTION INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT 
PULSED AFYERCOOL'NG 
PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
N LUNAR ORBIT OPERATIONS 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
FAILURE TYPEIMOOE SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
VALVE IS PARALLEL TO 
3 6 . 0 1 . 0 2 - 2 1  VALVE 
VALVE I S  I N  S E R I E S  TO 
36.01.04-19 VALVE 
P O S S I B L E  LOSS 
DEPLFTION O F  APS OXIDIZER 
O e IWERTlOrJ INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT Y 
P PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
O s APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE U 
R PULSED AFTERCOQLING v 
S r TRANSEARTH INJECTION W 
PHASE FAILURE EFFECT ON RNS 
NONE 
REDUNDANCY I S  PROVIDED 
F POSSIBLE LOSS 
G 
H LOSS O F  ATTITUDE CONTROL 
I 
J 
K 
L 
M 
0 
P 
4 
R 
S 
T 
U 
v 
W POSSIBLE LOSS 
LOSS OF ATTITUDE CONTROL 
DURING EARTH ORBIT OPERATIONS 









MIDCOURSE CORRECTION-IDLE MODE 
TRANSEARTH COAST 
EARTH ORBIT CAPTURE 
PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
ORBIT RESUPPLY AND C/O OPERATIONS 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
MISSION OR SPACECRAFT 
NONE 
POSSIBLE Loss 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
RNS MAY NOT BE 
AVAILABLE FOR MISSION 
w 
OI 
FELIABILI'TY FAILURE EFFECT ANALYSIS G PULSED AFTERCOOLING K PULSED AFTERCOOLING P PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
MISSION: LUNAR SHUTTLE 
CORRECTION-IDLE L C~RCULAR~ZE AT TARGET ALTITUDE Q APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 
TRANSLUNAR COAST U 
CLASS: 1 - m R m  R PULSED AFTERCOOLING H INSERTION fNTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT PULSED AFTERCOOL'NG v 
MODULE: COMMAIiD AND CONTROL N LUNAR ORBIT OPERATIONS S . TRASSEARTH INJECTION I PULSED AFTERCOOLING W 
SYSTEM: SYSTEM AUXILIARY PROPULSION FAILURE EFFECT ON 
ITEM FUNCTION FAILURE TYPEIMOOE SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE PHASE FAILURE EFFECT ON RNS 
F 
G 
I 
J 
K 
L 
M 
NONE 
VALVE IS I N  P A R W E L  TO 
36-01 .02 -26  VALVE 
NONE 
VALVE I S  I N  SERIES TO 36.01.04-15 
VALVE 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
DEPLETION OF APS FUEL SUPPLY 
: 
J 
V 
W 
1- FAILURE TO OPEN 
2. FAILURE TO CLOSE 
3. LEAKAGE 
36.01.02-25 
VALVE, GH2 
F 
G 
I 
J 
K 
L 
M 
0 
NO-Y OPEN S O ~ N O I D  VALVE 
DIVERTS FLOW FROM GH2 
REGULATORS TO 36.01.04-15 
MCHANGER N.C' VALVE 
NONE 
REDUNDANCY I S  PROVIDED 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
LOSS OF ATTITUDE CONTROL 
P 
Q 
R 
S 
T 
U 
v 
W POSSIBLE LOSS 
LOSS OF ATTITUDE CONTROL 
DURING EARM ORBIT OPERATIONS 


FORM -76 
G PULSED AFTERCOOLING K PULSED AFTERCOOLING P PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
MISSION: LUNAR SHUTTLE M1OCOURSE CORRECT1ON-lDLEMODE L @ CIRCULARIZE A T  TARGET ALTITUDE (1 e APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE TRANSLUNAR COAST 
CLASS: - HYBRID H INSERTtON INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT PULSED AFTERCOOLING R PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
I PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
S TRANSEARTH INJECTION 
PROVIDE UNIDIRECTIONAZ, 
FLOW FROM TURBOPWE TO 
KEAT EXCHANGER 36.01.03-05 CHECK VALVE 
POSSIBLE M S S  P O S S I S L E  LOSS 
DEPLETION O F  A S  FUEL SUPPLY 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
-- 
RNS MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE 

F a TRANSLUNAR INJECTION J a APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 0 * INSERTION INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBlT T PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
RELIABILITY FAILURE EFFECT ANALYSIS P PULSED AFTERCOOLING MIDCOURSE CORRECTION-IDLE MODE G PULSED AFTERCOOLING K PULSED AFTERCOOLING TRANSEARTH COAST 
ISSION: LUNAR SHUTTLE M1OCOURSE CORRECTION-'DLE 'ODE L e CIRCULARIZE A T  TARGET ALTITUDE (1 . APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE TRANSLUNAR COAST U e EARTH ORBIT CAPTURE 
: 1 - HYBRID R PULSED AFTERCOOLING H e INSERTlON INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT PULSED AFTERCOOL'NG V PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
LE: C O h % m  APJE CON'TROL N LUNAR ORBIT OPERATIONS S e TRAiXSEARTH INJECTION I PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
NORiIALLY CMSED (N.c. ) 
SOLENOID VALVE CONTROLS REDUNDAWY I S  PROVIDED 
FLOW FROM LH2 SUPPLY TO THE 36.01.03-07 N. C. VALVE 
3 6 . 0 1 - 0 3 - 0 2  TURBOPUMP 
POSSIBLX M S S  POSSIBLE LOSS 
DEPLETION OF AF'S FUEL SUPPLY 
POSSIBLE LOSS 
EARTH ORBIT OPERATIONS AVAILRBLE FOR MISSION 






















P PULSED AFTERCOOLIWG K PULSED AFTEFICOOLING 
R PULSED AFTERCCIOLING 
S a TRAISEARTM INJECTION 
I PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
GAS GrnRATOR 
USE I N  HEAT EXCHANGERS TO REDUNDANCY I S  PROVIDED BY REDUNDANCY I S  PROVIDED 
CONDITION PROPELLANTS 36.01.04-23 GAS GENERATOR 






F e TRANSLUNAR INJECTION J m APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 0 e INSERTION INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT T PULSE0 AFTERCOOLING 
RELIABILITY FAILURE EFFECT ANALYSIS 
G PULSED AFTERCOOLING K PULSED AFTERCOOLING P PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
MIDCOURSE CORRECTION-IDLE MODE 
TRANSEARTH COAST 
MISSION: LUNAR SHUTTLE MIDCOURSE L e CIRCULARIZE AT TARGET ALTITUDE 0 e APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE TRANSLUNAR COAST U . EARTH ORBIT CAPTURE 
CLASS: 1 - H Y B R I D  
H @ INSERTION INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT PULSED AFTERCOOLING R PULSED AFTERCOOLING V PULSED AFTERCOOLING MODULE. COblMAND AND CONTROL 
I PULSEO AFTERCOOLING N LUNAR ORBIT OPERATIONS S TRAXSEARTH INJECTION SYSTEM: AUXILIARY PROPULSION 
HEAT EXCHANGER CONDITIONS THE OXYGEN 1. CLOGGED 
PROPELLANT BY RAISING ITS REDLNDAIrCY I S  FROVIDPD 
TEMPERAT'LrT(E TO TBD OR 
2 .  LEAKAGE FOSSI3LE M S S  
POSSIBLZ LCSS 
LOSS OF ATTITUDE CONTRCL RNS KAY NOT 9 E  
DURING EARTH ORBIT OPERATIOIS AVAILABLE FC? MISSIOr! 




















MLIABfLlTM FAILURE EFFECT ANALYSIS 
YAW GYRO AND PROVIDES YAW RATE AND 
ELECTR0hTC.S ATTITUDE SIGNAL FOR 
PLIGHT CONTROL. 
TRANSLUNAR INELTION J m AMLUldE PLCNB CHANGE 
PULSE0 AF4ERFaOLING K PUISEU AFTBRI'OOLING 
'IDGBURSE GORWEGI'oPd-'obEmCPE L . CIRCULARIZE AT TARGET ALTITUDE 
TRAMLUNAR CoAST 
IRbSERIIOIU fNTO ELLISTICAL LUNAR ORBIT 
PULSE0 AFTERCOOLtNG N LUNAR ORBIT 13eER4TlWS 
FAILURE EFFECT OM 
FAILURE TYPEIMOOE SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
1. FAILURE TO ACTUAL LOSS 
REDUNDANCY I S  PROVIDED BY YAW 
GYROS 37.01.04 AKD 37.01.6 
COMPWER WILL RECEIVE THREE 
O W P W S  FROM GYROS 37.01.04, 
3 7 - 0 1 - 6 5  AND 37.01.06 AND WILL 
IXSE A 2/3 LOGIC TO ELIMINATE A 
FAILED GYRO. 
O a IWCRTICN INTO ELLIWICAL LUNAP ORBIT T PULSED AFPERMOLING 
P PULSED AFWRCOOLIHG 
MIDCOURSE CORRECTION-IDLE MODE 
TRANSEARTH COAST 
o A ~ L U N E  PLANE CHANGE 
U e BCRTN ORBIT CAPTURE 
R PULSED AFTEA03OLING 
V PtJLSEB AFTERCOOLING 
S e I R A H S A R T H  1NKmIOI.I 
REDUNDANCY I S  PROVIDED BY YAW 
GYROS 37.01.04 and 37.01.05. 
REDUNDANCY I S  PROVIDED. 







N - i 0 L f  WOOS 
U B EARTH ORBIT CAPTURE 
'd PULSED AFTERC00blNG 
m CONTROL 
E NAVIGATION 
RFVERSE CURRFNT NONE. FAILURE DOES NOT APPLY TO A 
RELAY ASSEMBLY CURRENT OLE OF THE POllER SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS 
SUPPLY 37.01.11 AND D I S -  
ACTUAL LQSS 
SUPPLY DRAWN CURRENT FROM NOT REQUIRFI) POVIER SUPPLY 37.01.11 I S  REMOVED REDUNDANCY I S  PROVIDED. 
THE SYSTEM. FROM THE SYSTEM. REDUNDANT POIIER 
SUPPLY 37.01.10 WILL PROVIDE THE 
REQUIRED ELECTRICAL POFTER . 



U o EARIW ORBIT GAVWFIE 
W P U L S D  AFTEW030LiNG 
I PU!SEC) AFTPRCQQLING 
ACTUAL LOSS 
THIS ITEM IS  NOT REQUIRED FOR 
SYSTEM OPERATION, APPROPRIATE 
SIGNAIS CAN BE OBTAINED FRM 
OTKER SENSORS INCLUDING THE 
REDUNDANT LANDMARK TRACKER 









U U l T W  W I T  6WTilWi 
APD CONTROL I/ WLSZCt AeTEl-LlM 
Am CONTROL 
ACTUAL LOSS 
THE UPLINK SYSTJBI I S  LOST. THIS THIS SYSTEM I S  NUT REQUIRED FOR 
SYSTEM I S  NOT RE&VIRED FOR MISSION MISSION SUCCESS. 

G PULSED AFTERCa9311W K PULSED AFTERGOUkItdG T R A W A R T  l-I G C l W  
'IBDSUWSE L m CIRCULARIZE AT PARGET ALTITUDE 0 BI ApoLuNE PLANE CHANGE TRAMLUNAR COAST U m EARTH ORBIT CAPTURE 
W B I-ERTlgRI iN7O ELLIPYICAL LUNAR ORBIT ABrEaCCrci'fdG R PULSED AFTERa30LlMG V PULSED A F T E R W L I N G  
I PULSE0 AFTERCOOLING I4 LUL4AR CRBiT C)PSRATIOE(S S T R A N a A R ' m  IN&GIiDFI 
SlQN OR SPACECRAFT 
POSSIBLE LOSS. LOSS OF FOR 
FUEL CELL 37.04.05 FUEL CELL 37.04.05 MAY PR- 
GENEWION OF ELECTRICAL POWER. 
FUEL CELL 37.04.08 WITH SEPARATE 
POSSIBLE LOSS 

H 61 sWRTlC.W INTO Etl l tPTfCAL LUNAR ORPIT 
OXYGEN ASSEMBLY POSSIBLE WSS. LOSS OF LO2 FOR 
FUEL CELL 37.04.05 FUEL CELL 37.04.05 MAY PREVENT REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED BY FUEL 
GENERATION OF ELECTRICAL POWER. CELL 37.04.08. 
FUEL CELL 37.04.08 WITH SEPARATE 
LO2 SUPPLY WILL PROVIDE ELECTRICAL 
POSSIBLE: LOSS. POSSIBLE LOSS. POSSIBLE LOSS 
POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO OTHER POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO OTHER 
COEIPONENTS I N  THE SUBSYSTEN. CWONENTS IN THE COMMAND AND 
COWROL MODULE. 

H-IDLEMOM 
U 8, EARTH ORBIT CAITVRE 
V P1JLSO AFTEWCQOLIW 
I PULSE0 A F T E f l W L l K  
GENEXATES ELECTRICAL 1. FAILURE TO ACTUAL LOSS BW REDUNDANCY I S  
POWER FOR RNS SYSTEMS. PROVIDED BY FUEL CELL 37.04.08. REDUNDANCY I S  PROVIDED BY FUEL 
CELL 37.04.08. 
ACTUAL M S S .  SHUTOFF VALVES 
37.04.11 AND 37.04.13 PROVIDE REDUNDANCY I S  PROVIDED BY FUEL 
SHUTOFF CAPABILITY BllT LOSS OF 
LH2 m ID2 P R m  GWERATION 
OF ELECTRICAL POWER. ELECTRICAL 
POWER WILL BE PROVIDED BY 
REDUNDANT FUEL CELL 37.04.08. 





F a TRANSLUNAR 1NECTlCiPd 
S m O F F  VALVE 
LIQUID HYDROGEN BEJ!WEEN TKE LIQurS, HYDROGEN MILL NOT BE DELIVJBED M FUEL 
CONTROL ASSEMBLY 37.04.06 CELL 37.04.05 CAUSING LOSS OF 
AND FUEL CELL 37.01.05 ABILITY TO GENERATE E L E m I C A L  
POWEII. REDUNDANT FUEL C E U  
37.04.08 WILL PROVIDE ELECTRICAL 
2. FAILURE TO SAME AS ABOVE 
F Z M i I N  OPEN 
3. FAILURE TO NONE. HYDROGEN CONTROL MODULE 
37.04.06 PROVIDES REDUNDANCY. 
4. FAILURE TO NO?=. HYDROGEN COhTROL MODULE 
REMAIN CLOSED 37.04.06 PROVIDES REDUNDANCY. 
NONE. HYDROGEN CONTROL MODULE 
37.04.06 PROVIDES REDUNDANCY 
0 B IWERTIOH IMTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR OPPllt i PULS&CL WFTERCBCjLlNG 
F PlJLSED BFTERCOOLIMG 
MIUCBURE CBRBEC4101"I-iDLE W O E  
T R A W A R T M  COAST 
O * APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 
R PULSED A F I E R e R O L l M  
S e TWAMSARTH I N S m l O N  
PHASE FAILURE EFFECT OM RMS 
REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED BY 
CELL 37.04.08. 
REDUNDANCS I S  PROVIDED. 

P I 'ULSD AFTERCOOLING 
R PULSEO AFTEROOOLING 
AND CONTROL ?fODUI;E S e TRANSEARTH INJECTION 
SHUTOFF VALVE 
LIQUID OXYGEN BETWEEN THE LIQUID OXYGEN NOT BE DELIVERED TO FUEL CELL REDUNDANCY I S  PROVIDED BY FUEL 
CONTROL ASSEMBLY 37.04.07 37.04.05 CAUSING LOSS OF A B I L I T Y  
AND FUEL CELL 37.01.05 TO GENERATE ELECTRICAL POWER. 
REDUNDANT FUEL CELL 37.04.08 WILL 
PROVIDE ELECTRICAL POWER. 
2. FAILURE TO SAME AS ABOVE 
P RKMAIN o m  
37.04.07 PROVIDES REDUNDANCY REDUNDANCY I S  PROVIDED. 
4. FAILURE TO NONE. OXYGEN CONTROL MODULE 
REMAIN CLOSED 37.04.07 PROVIDES REDUNDANCY 
NONE. OXYGEN CONTROL MODULE 
37.04.07 PROVIDES REDUNDANCY. 






















RELIABILITY FAILURE EFFECT ANALYSIS F e TRANSLUNAR INXCTION J e APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE 
G PULSED AFTERCOOLING K PULSE0 AFTERCOOLING 
MISSION: LUNAR SHUTTLE TRAMTLuNAR wRRECT'ON-lDLE COAST MODE L . CIRCULARIZE AT TARGET ALTITUDE 
. . . . . . . - - - . - . . . . - - . .- 
CLASS: 1H 
MODULE: CCU.IMAM) AM, CONTROL H e INSERTION INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT 
PULSED 
I PULSED AFTERCOOLING N LUNAR ORBIT OPERATIONS SYSTEM: ELECTRICnr, FAILURE EFFECT ON 
ITEM FUNCTION FAILURE TYPEIMODE SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
37.04.38 
BATTERY 
PROVIDES PEAK LOAD CURRENT 
-- 
1. FAILURE TO 
OPERATE 
2. SHORT 
AcmrAL LOSS 
REDUNDANCY BATTERY 37.04.39 
WILL PROVIDE RXQUIIIED ELECTRICAL 
POWER. 
ACTUAL LOSS 
ABILITY TO PRODUCE POWER I S  
LOST. REDUNDANCY I S  PROVIDED 
BY BATTERY 37.04.39. RFVERSE 
CURRENT PROTECTION IS PROVIDED 
BY RFVERSE CURRENT ASSEMBLY 
37.04.40 
o . INSERTION INTO ELLIPTICAL LUNAR ORBIT T 
P PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
O e APOLUNE PLANE CHANGE U 
R PULSED A F T E R W L I N G  v 
S e TRANSEARTH IKECTION W 
PHASE FAILURE EFFECT ON RNS 
PHASES. REDUNDANCY IS PRovrnm 
BY BATTERY 37.04.39 
PHASES. REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED 
PULSED AFTERCOOLING 
MIDCOURSE CORRECTION-IDLE MODE 
T R W A R T H  COAST 
e EARTH ORBIT CAPTURE 
PULSED AFTERCOOLING 












2, 4 CRITICALITY ANALYSIS 
The c r i t i ca l i ty  ana lys i s  computer  pr in tout  shee t s  a r e  p resen ted  in  this section.  
The methodology and method of computation a r e  d i s cus sed  in Section 2. 2. Each 
itern l i s t ed  i n  the FMEA shee t s  i n  Section 2. 3 a s  a n  actual ,  probable,  o r  pos -  
sible loss i t e m  i s  analyzed i n  the  ana lys i s  and quantified. 
The computer  printout  shee t s  displayed in  th i s  sect ion considered a C l a s s  1 
Hybrid des ign and t r e a t ed  ex te rna l  leakage a s  a viable fa i lu re  mode.  The 
c r i t i ca l i ty  ranking l i s t  f o r  a Class  1 Hybrid RNS and a Class  3 without leakage 
is  shown in  Table 2-  7. The units  of c r i t i ca l i ty  a r e  f a i l u r e s  p e r  mi l l ion m i s -  
s i o n s ,  The r e su l t s  f o r  a Class  1 Hybrid RNS with leakage a r e  given in  the 
computer pr intout  c r i t i ca l i ty  ranking l i s t  tabulated i n  Table  2-8. A Class  3 
RNS cr i t i ca l i ty  ranking l i s t  would appear  the  s a m e  a s  Table 2-8 with I t ems  
15. 06-04 ,  15. 06-08, and 15. 09-07 removed and I t em 15. 05. 05 added with 
a c r i t i ca l i ty  of 815 units.  
T a b l e  2-7 
CRITICALITY RANKING 
(Without  L e a k a g e )  
Rank  C r i t i c a l i t y  N a m e  Numbe  x 
Eng ines ,  A P S  (20 )  3 6 .  01, 01, 01  
G a s  G e n e r a t o r  ( 2 )  3 6 ,  01, 02, 17 
G a s  G e n e r a t o r  ( 2 )  3 6 ,  01, 04, 17 
Eng ines ,  P r o p e l l a n t  Se t t l ing  ( 2 )  3 6 .  03, 01. OB 
Valve,  B l o c k  15. 05, 015:k 
C h e c k  Valve ,  Resupp ly  25. 09, 1 1 
Fill Va lve  25, 09, 03 
Fill Va lve  25. 09, 04  
Nozzle ,  R e s u p p l y  25. 09, 12 
F l o w  M e t e r  25. 09 ,  $ 0  
Vol tage  L i m i t e r  S e n s o r  3 7 .  04, 19 
Vol tage  L i m i t e r  S e n s o r  3 7 .  04, 20 
F i l t e r  3 6 .  O l ,  02, El 
F i l t e r  3 6 .  01, 04, E l  
Vol tage  L i m i t e r  C o n t r o l  3 7 ,  0 4 ,  2 1  
Vol tage  L i m i t e r  C o n t r o l  3 7 .  04, 22 
Valve ,  Ven t  a n d  Rel ie f  15, 10, 02 
Valve ,  Rel ie f  15. 10, 03 
.I, 
".Class 3  only. 
T a b l e  2 4 .  CLASS 1 HYBRID RNS 
C R I T I C A L I T Y  RANKING L I S T  QUAD VALVES9CONTROL Gti2 
QUAD VALVESpFLT VENT GH2 
DUCTING9FUEL APS 
DUCTING,OXIDIZER9APS 
CHECK VALVE, Gti2 t APS 
REM NO. RANK CRIT.  NO. NAME 
1 0 0 7 2 . 3  ENGINESqAPS(2OJ 
8399.0 GAS GENERATOR,LH2,APS(Z) 
8399.0 GAS GENERATOR, GO29 APS ( 2 )  
2592 .5  QUAD VALVES,PRESS LOZAPS 
2592.5 QUAD VALVESvPRESS LH2APS 
CHECK VALVEqbH2p APS 
CHECK VALVE9GO2 PAPS 
CHECK VALVEqFO2 ,APS 
VALVEqGRD F I L L p D R A I N  LH2  
DUCTING,GH2 1 4 2 5 . 9  CNTRL VALVES,GHZ,NC22APS 
1 4 2 5 . 9  CNTRL VAL VES,G02,NC22APS 
1 2 9 6 . 3  QUAD VALVESvLH2 VENTYAPS 
1 2 9 6 . 3  QUAD VALVES9L02 VENTTAPS 
1021.4 ENGINES,PROP S E T T L I N G ( 2 )  
DUCTING,VENT+RELIEFqGH2 
W G T f  NGIFCT-WT&M-- -  
DUCTING,GH2 
DUCTINGpGH2 
F I L L  V A t V E p I N F L T  XFER 
657.5 GROUND PRESS VALVEpGH2 
653 .4  CK VALVE,RESUPPLY LH2  
6 4 8 . 1  VALVE,LHP,NCAPS 
6 4 8 . 1  VALVE,LH2pNGAPS 
6 4 8 . 1  VALVEqLH2,GRO F I L L v A P S  
F I L L  VALVEv INFLT XFER 
DUCTINGsLH2 F I L L  
NOZZLEqRESUPPLY LH2  
FLOW METER,RESUPPLY LHZ 
VOLTAGE L I M I T E R  SENSOR 
648 .1  VALVEqGH2 ,GRO F ILL ,APS 
6 4 8 . 1  VALVE,GOZ,NOAPS 
648.1 VALVErG02 ,NOAPS 
6 4 8 . 1  VALVE, G02,GRD F I L L P A P S  
648 .1  VALVEPGH2,NOAPS 
VOLTAGE L I M I T E R  SENSOR 
FILTERqGH2,APS 
FILTER,GOZ,APS 
DUCTING,FEED LH2 
DUCTING,LHZ,APS 
6 4 8 . 1  VALVE, GH2 ,NOAPS 
6 4 8 . 1  VALVE,L02,NCAPS 
6 4 8 . 1  V A L V E I L O ~ ~ N O A P S  
6 4 8 . 1  VALVEvL02,NCAPS 
6 4 8 . 1  VALVEqL02,NOAPS 
DUCTING,LO29APS 
CK VALVE9CHIt-L NERVAFEED 
CK V A L V E t C H I L L  STAGEFEED 
CK VALVE, C H I L L  NERVAFEED 
VALVEqGii2qNOAPS 
6 4 8 . 1  VALVE,L02 qGRD F ILL ,APS 
6 4 8 . 1  VALVE9LH2pNCAPS 
648 .1  VALVE, LH2 ,NOAPS 
612.5 QUAD VALVES,XPULSION GH2 
612 .5  QUAD VALVES,CONTROL GH2 
SO VALVE,GH2qHTEXCHp APS 
SO VALVE GO29 HTEXCHq APS 
VALVE,GHZ,NOAPS 
VALVE,GHZpNOAPS 
VALVE,GHZ,NOAPS 
612 .5  QUAD VALVEStPREPRESS GH2 
612.5 OUAD VALVES,RESUPPLY LH2  
612 .5  QUAD VALVESqFLT VENT,Gii2 
612 .5  QUAD VALVES9CHILLDOWN 
612 .5  QUAD VALVES, XPULSIGN GH2 
SO VALVE, GH2,HTEXCHpAPS 
VALVE, GO29 NOAPS 
7 3 64.8 SO VALVE,GO2,HTEXCH~APS 
74 64.8 SO VALVE, GH2,HTEXCH* APS 
-?5- - --- d 4  r8 - - t tALV€ ,fro2 ,,NOBPS 
76 64.8 SL VALVE,GOP',HTEXCH, APS 
-7- --6+d - SO- - V A ~ V E T I ~ ~ ~ ~ , H T E X C H ~ A P S  
78 64.8 VALVE,GOZ 9NOAPS 
7 9 64.8 VALVE,GOZ,NOAPS 
*- 6b. 8 SO WBtV€~tff£,HTEXCH, APS 
- - 
8 1 61.0 QCCUMULATOR,GHZ,APS 
SF.-- - - 61.0 h9€UXULATOR~602,APS 
83 61.0 TANKPLOP STORAGE,APS 
84 61.0 TANKpLH2 STORAGEqAPS 
8 5  --- - 54.0 -- VOLTACE L I M I T E R  CNTRL 
86 54.0 VOLTAGE L I M I T E R  CNTRL 
.+7 - - -kf 6 whkVE,VENT+RfLIEF,Gn2 
8 8 38.0 ISOLATION VALVEpLHZ 
8 9 38.0 ISOLATION VALVEpLH2 
%----- 37- - D t t C T I N G  p t - 2  TR4NSFER 
CHECK VALVE,L02?APS 
CHECK VAL VE,LCZ,APS 
CHECK VALVEyLH2 YAPS 
CHECK VALVE,LHZ,APS 
0 2  ASSY ,FUEL CELL (S )  
0 2  ASSYpFUEL C E L L ( S )  
H2 ASSY ,FUEL CELL (S )  
H2 4SSY ,FUEL CELL (S )  
VALVE,RELIEF,GHZ 
HEAT EXCHQNGER,LHZ,APS 
HEAT EXCHANGER,LHZ,APS 
- W f  XEHAA'M*d4PiAPS--- 
HEAT EXCHANGER,LOZ,APS 
DISCONNECT 1 Gt32 PRESS 
CHECK DISCONNECT ?PRESS 
DISCONNECT,LHZ TRANSFER 
DISCONNECT~Lt IZ  F I L L  
R E L I E F  VALVE,GHZ,APS 
R E L I E F  VALVE,GOZ?APS 
REFEYENCE R U N  
GLASS d HYBRID  PNS 
PROPELLANT F t E D p  15-05 
- I - - .  - ISSLATION V!AL VEpLH2 15.05 
( 2 3 6 2 ) F A I L  TO PEMAIN CLOSE0 I 
( 2 0 0 2 1  LEAKAGE 37 
- - - - - - - - -- - - 
ITOTAL 3 8 
- 
- __2- ._ - I . L A T I 0 N  VALVE, LHZ - 15.05-02 
( 2 9 6 2 )  F A I L  TO REMAIN CLOSED I 
( 2 0 0 2 )  LEAKAGE 3 7 
- - - ITOTAL _ - 3 8 
3 
-- - - - . - N:TING,LHE TRANSFER 15.05-03 ( 2 0 0 2 )  LEAKAGE 38  
ITOTAL 3 8 
4 OISCONNECTILHE TRANSFER 15.0 5-04 
LEAKAGE 5 
ITOTAL 5 
~ G S X T E M  FEPECLANT ~ ~ ~ 6 ~ 1 5 . 0 5  - 
C R I T I C A L I T Y  118.7 
- R E L I A B I L I T Y -  , 9 9 9 8 8 1  
P H A S E F  P H A S E G  P H A S E H  P H A S E 1  PHASE J 
- -  
t .75 ) (108 .  ) ( e l  ) ( 12. ) ( .1 ) 
PHASE C R I T I C A L I T Y  2.0 6.0 6 . 0  6 . 2  6.3 
FAILURE C R I T I C A L I T Y  28.0 48 -7 3.3 4.8 2.9 
-- - - - -  - - - --  -- 
PHASE E R PHASE S 
I . 1 9  ( 1 4 . )  t .I 1 ( 12. ) (.1 ) 
PHASE CRII_ICALITY 
- -- --- 
_ 7.4 7.7 7.8 8 .1 8.2 
FAILURE CRITICALITY 2.0 3.2 1.5 2.0 1.0 
PHASE L 
( .I ) 
6.7 
2.5 
PHASE U 
t .25  1 
11.0 
1.3 
PHASE 14 
( 19. ) 
7.3 
5.5 
PHASE V 
( 45. 1 
1 0  - 7  
.O 
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REFEdEMCE RUN I C A F t  2 4  
G L A S S  I H Y B R I O  ENS 
F L I G H T  V E N T s i 5 . 1 9  
QUCIIMG,FCT VEMTIGHZ 15-11-01 
(20 02 )  LEAKAGE 216 
ITOTAL 216 
Q U 4 0  VALVES,FLT VENT,GH2 15.11-02 
( 2 0 0 2 )  LEAKAGE 613 
ITOTAL 
SUBSYSTEM FLIGHT VENT, 15.  I1 
C H I T  I C A L I T Y  (128.7 
REL IAB IL ITY  ,999171 
PHASE F 
( .75 1 
PHAj E CRITICALITY 34.5 
FAILURE CRITICALITY 476.4 
PHASE 0 
( .i ) 
IU PHASE CRITICALITY 52.9 
vl 
R) FAILUTE CRITICALITY 34.3 
PHASE G 
(108 .  1 
38.8 
64.9 
PHASE P 
( 14 .  1 
52.5 
4.2 
PHASE H 
( .I ) 
42.6 
56.7 
PHASE Q 
( .I 1 
56.0 
26.3 
PHASE I 
( 1 2 . )  
42.3 
6.4 
PHASE R 
( 12. 1 
55.4 
2.7 
PHASE J 
( .1 1 
46.1 
49.5 
PHASE S 
( .1 1 
58.9 
17.9 
PHASE K 
( 12 .  ) 
45.7 
5.5 
PdASE T 
( 72. 1 
61.1 
9.7 
PHASE L 
( .1 1 
49.4 
42.1 
PHASE U 
( - 2 5  1 
71.3 
22 -8 
PHASE H 
( 19. ) 
49.3 
7.3 
PHASE V 
( 45. ) 
72.0 
2.1 

REFERENCE RUM k CbSE 3 0  
DUZTIN6,GHZ 2 5 - 0 6 - 0 1  
(23 021  . LEAKAGE 216 
ITOTAL 216 
auno VALVES,XPULSION GHZ 25.06-02 
(2n 02)  LEAKAGE 613 
ITOTAL 6 1  3 
( 20021  LEAKAGE 613 
ITOTAL 6 1 3  
CHECK OISCONNECT,PRESS 25.06-05 
(2002 )  LEAKAGE 5 
ITOTAL 5 
SUBSYSTEM PREjSURIZATION,25.06 
CRIT IG ALIT Y 1446.6 
REL IAS IL ITY  -998553  
PHASE GRITICALITY 
FAILURE CRITICALITY 
PHASE CRITICALITY 
FAILURE CRITICALITY 
PHASE F 
( .75 1 
60 2 
831.7 
PHASE 0 
( .l 1 
92.3 
59.9 
PHASE G PHASE H 
(108 .  ) ( 1 1 
67.7 74.4 
113.4 98.9 
PHASE P PHASE Q 
( 14 .  1 ( .1 1 
91.6 97.8 
7.4 45.8 
PHASE I 
( 12. 1 
73 - 8  
11.1 
PHASE R 
( 12. ) 
96.8 
4.6 
PHASE J 
( .i ) 
8q.4 
86.4 
PHASE S 
(.I 1 
102.9 
31.2 
PHASE K 
( 12. 1 
79.8 
9.6 
PHASE T 
( 72. 1 
106.6 
17.0 
PHASE L 
( .I 1 
86.2 
73.4 
PHASE U 
c.25 1 
124.5  
39.7 
PHASE M 
( 19. 1 
86.0 
12.7 
PHASE V 
( 45. 1 
125.7 
3.6 
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REFERENCE RUN 1 CASE 40  
CLASS 1 HYB9IO RNS 
FLIGHT VENT.25.11 
- . .- -- - - - - - . . - - . - - -. . - - - . -- - -. . . 
I OUCTING,GHL- 25.11-01 - - . - - -  
(20 02 )  LEAKAGE 216  
ITOTAL 216 
QUAD VALVES3FLT VENT GH2 25-11-02 
(2D021 - -- LEAKAGE 613 
ITOTAL 613 
SUB~YSTEM FLIGHT ~ E N ~ r 2 f . 1 1  
CRIT ICALITY,  828.7 
. - R E L I A B I L I T Y  .999171 
PHASE F 
( .75 1 
- PHASE CRIT~CAL ITY 34.5 
FAILURE CRITICALITY 476.4 
- -  - -  - 
PHASE 0 
( .I 1 
8-- - PHASE CRITICALITY - 52.9 FAILURE CRITICALITY 34.3 
PHASE G 
(108. ) 
38.8 
64.9 
PHASE P 
( 14. 1 
52.5 
4.2 
PHASE H 
.l -1 
42.6 
56.7 
PHASE Q 
( .I 1 
56.0 
26.3 
PHASE I 
( 1 2 .  ) 
42.3 
6.4 
PHASE R 
( 1 2 .  ) 
55.4 
2.7 
PHASE J 
( .I 
46.1 
49.5 
PHASE S 
c . 1  J 
58.9 
17.9 
PHASE K 
( 12. 
45.7 
5.5 
PHASE T 
( 72. ) 
61.1 
9.7 
PHASE L PHASE N 
( - 1  ) ( 1 9 . )  
49.4 49.3 
42.1 7.3 
PHASE U PHASE V 
(.25 ( 45. 1 
71.3 72.0 
22.8 2.1 
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REFEWENSE FUN 1 CASE 46 
CLASS 1 H Y B S I U  RNS 
E N G I N E  S / S  QFS 36,08.01 
CNTSL VALVES,Gt42,NC22APS 36.01.01-04 
( 2 n 0 2 )  LEAKAGE 1426 
ITOTAL 1426  
CNTKL VALVES,G02,NC22APS 76.01.01-06 
(2(202) LEAKAGE 1426 
ITOTAL 1426  
3 !3J>TING,FUEL, AFS 36.01.01-07 
(23 3 2 )  LEAKAGE 45 8 
ITOTAL 4 5 8  
DU3TIhG~OXIOIZER,  APS 36.01.01-08 
( 2 0 0 2 )  LEAKAGE 458 
ITOTAL 458 
SUBSYSTEM FNGINE S/S APS 36.01.01 
CRI1 I C A L I T Y  3766.8 
RELIAi! I L I T Y  a996233 
PHASE F PHASE G PHASE H PHASE I PHASE J PriASE K PHASE L PHASE M 
( -75 ) ( 108 .  ) ( .l 1 ( 1 2 . )  (.I 1 ( 1 2 . )  f .I ) ( 19 .  ) 
PHASE CRITICAL11 Y 74.1 179.3 185.6 193  .A 199.8 207.6 213.4 227.9 
FAI-USE CRITICALITY 1023.3 1394.8 121.7 136.9 106.3 119.1 90.4 156.0 
PHASE 0 PHASE P PHASE Q PHASE R PHASE S PHASE T PHASE U PHASE V 
( -1 ( 14 .  ) ( e l  1 ( 1 2 . )  ( - 1  ( 7 2 . )  ( - 2 5  ) ( 45. 1 
PHASE CRITICALITY 233.2 242.3 247.4 254.3 259.1 325.0 343.2 380.8 
FAIL USE CRITIC4LITY 73.7 91.2 56.4 57.0 38.4 209.2 48.9 44.5 
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H E h T  EXCHAI\IGERsLH2r APS 36.03.*0;1-10 
( 2 0  02  LEAKAGE 9 
I T O T A L  9 
VALVE,GHZ,NOAPS 36.01.02-19 
( 2 0 0 2 )  LEAKAGE 6 5 
ITOTAL 6 5  
SO VALVE,GHEIHTEXCH,APS 36.01,02-20 
( 2 0  0 2 )  LEAKAGE 6 5 
ITOTAL 65 
SO VALVE GO?, HTEXCH 9 APS 36.01.02-21 
( 2 0 0 2 )  LEAKAGE 6 5  
ITOTAL 6 5 
HEPT EXCHANGERyLH2,APS 36.01.02-24 
( 2 0 0 2 )  LEAKAGE 9 
I T O T A L  9 
VALVE ,GH2,NOAPS 36.0 1 - 0 2 - 2 5  
( 2 s  0 2  1 LEAKAGE 6 5 
ITOTAL 6 5 
VALVE,GHZ,NOAPS 36.01.02-26 
( 2 0  0 2  LEAKAGE 6 5 
'ITOTAL 65 
GAS GENERATOR,LH29APS(2) 36.01.02-17 
( 8 1 2 )  BURNT HROUGH 8 3 9 9  
ITOTAL 8 3 9 9  
SUBSYSTEM GH2 PRESSURANT PPS 36.01.02 
C R I T I C A L I T Y  14344 .2  
PHASE F 
( .75 ) 
PHASE C R I T I C A L I T Y  1520.3 
FAILURE. C R I T I C A L I T Y  2991.0 
PHASE 0 
( .1 1 
PHASE C R I T I C A L I T Y  548.7 
F A I L U R E  C R I T I C A L I T Y  301.6 
PHASE G 
( 1 0 8 .  
2301.8 
4185.0 
PHASE P 
( 1 4 .  ) 
637.9 
403.7 
PHASE H PHASE I 
( .I f ( 12. 
475.0 5 2 5 . 1  
376.0 4 3 7  .O 
PPASE 4 PHASE R 
( .1 ) ( 12. ) 
570.7 618.9 
274.8 3 1 3 . 1  
PHASE J 
( .1 
496 .9  
352 .2  
PHASE S 
( . I  1 
588.8 
2 4 6 . 8  
PHASE K 
( 1 2 .  ) 
546.6 
Lt07.9 
PHASE T 
( 72. 1 
1852 .9  
1673 .4  
PHASE L 
( .I ) 
5 1 8 . 0  
327.4 
PHASE U 
( - 2 5  ) 
1 0 0 0 . 3  
544.3 
PHASE M 
( 19. 1 
709 .1  
597 .  tr 
PHASE V 
( 45. 1 
1433.4 
912.2 



SUBSYSTEM 
SO V A L V E 9 b W 2 ~  Y T E X C H ,  APS 36 .01 .04-15  
( 2 0 0 2 )  L E A K A G E  65 
l T O S A L  6 5  
h E h T  E X C H A N G E R + i O Z ,  APS 36,0i,F4-i8 
( 2 f  0 2 )  LEAKAGF 9 
I T O T A L  9 
VALVE,GOZ,NOAPS 36.01.04-19 
(2C 0 2 )  LEAKAGE 6 5  
I T O T A L  65 
SL VALVE,GOZ,YTEXCH,APS 36.01.04-20 
( 2 0  0 2 )  LEAKAGE 6 5 
ITOTAL 6 5  
SO VALVE,GH2,HTEXCH,APS 36 .01 .04 -21  
(ED 0 2  LEPKAGE 6 5 
I T O T A L  6 5 
LEAKAGE 9 
ITOTAL 9 
VA-VE,GOZ,NOAPS 36.01.04-25 
( 2 0 0 2 )  LEAKAGE 6 5 
I T O T A L  6 5  
VALVETGO2 ,NOPP? 36.01.04-26 
( 2 3  0 2 )  LEAKAGE 6 5  
I T O T A L  6 5 
GAS GENERATOR,G02,APS(2) 36.01.04-17 
( 3 1 2 )  PURNT HROUGH 8 3 9 9  
I T O T A L  8 3 9 9  
GO2 PKESSURANT APS 36.01.04 
C R I T I C A L I T Y  14344 .2  
R E L I A ~ I L I T Y  - 9 8 5 6 5 6  
FHASE C R I T I C A L I T Y  
F A I -  URE C R I T I C A L I T Y  
PHASE CHIT I C A L I T Y  
F A I -  UKE C R I T I C A L I T Y  
PHASE F 
( .75 
1520 .3  
2991.0 
PHASE 0 
( .I ) 
548.7 
301.6 
PHASE G 
( 1 0 8 .  ) 
2301 .8  
4185.0 
PHASE P 
( 1 4 .  ) 
637.9 
403.7 
PHASE H 
( .i ) 
475.0 
376.0 
PHASE 4 
( .i b 
570.7 
274.8 
PHASE I 
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2, 5 REL,IABILITY DIAGRAMS 
The re l iabi l i ty  d i ag rams  a r e  p resen ted  h e r e  to  provide a visual  representa t ion 
of the breakdown of an  RNS into modules,  a module into sys tems ,  and a sys -  
t e r n  into subsystems.  The rel iabil i ty al locations and predic t ions  a r e  pr inted 
f o r  e ach  i tem.  The predic t ions  in th i s  sect ion do not cons ider  ex te rna l  leak-  
age and the re fore  a r e  consis tent  with Tables  2-3 and 2-4. Both concepts a r e  
displayed, with the  Class  1 Hybrid RNS f i r s t  and then the Class  3. 
2,6 RELIABILITY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A reliabil i ty improvement  t r a d e  study was  act ive  during the  en t i r e  Phase  I11 
study, E a r l y  i n  the study per iod a s e r i e s  of p r e l im ina ry  rel iabil i ty ana lyses  
we re conducted which resul ted i n  re l iabi l i ty  improvement  recommendat ions  
in  the propulsion, a s t r i on i c s  and aux i l i a ry  propulsion sys tem.  These  recom-  
mendations plus additional design changes resu l ted  i n  the design depicted in  
F igu re s  2-2,  2-3, and 2-4. As these  f igures  show, m o s t  of the functional 
f a i l u r e  modes  ( fa i lure  to  operate,  etc.  ) have been made  nonflight c r i t i c a l  (no 
single f a i l u r e )  by means  of redundancy. Only the s t ruc tu r a l  fa i lu re  modes  
(burs t ,  leakage, etc.  ) r ema in  a s  single fa i lure  i t ems .  In general ,  these  
fa i lu re  modes  will be handled analytically. These  ana lyses  will have t o  show 
that  the probabil i ty of occur rence  of these  fa i lure  modes  h a s  been reduced to  
an  acceptable level. A few single fa i lu re  i t e m s  will  always remain,  e. g, , 
meteoro id  penetra t ion of the propellant  tank, p r i m a r i l y  due t o  the cost  of 
seduction o r  el imination being prohibitive. 
Specific rteliability/safety recommendat ions  a r e  made  f o r  each  flight c r i t i ca l  
i tem on the contingency planning worksheets  contained i n  Section 3,  1. 
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SAFETY ANALYSIS 
This  sect ion contains the flight safe ty  ana lys i s  pe r fo rmed  dur ing the 
P h a s e  I11 study. The  safe ty  ana lys i s  i s  p r i m a r i l y  a problem definition 
exe rc i s e ,  consist ing of the contingency planning work shee t s  (Section 3 ,  f ), 
which a r e  a continuation of the re l iabi l i ty  ana lys i s  desc r ibed  i n  Section 2,  
the fault  t r e e  ana lys i s  (Section 3. 2 ) ,  which approaches  the field of p rob lem 
definition in a d i f ferent  manne r  than the FMEA, the abo r t  ana lys i s  
(Section 3. 3 ) ,  which i s  a l s o  a p rob lem definition activi ty,  but one that dea l s  
with the operat ions  instead of the ha rdware ,  and the contingency plan 
(Section 3 .  4) ,  which p r e sen t s  recommendat ions  on the solutions to some  of 
the p rob l ems  identified in the abo r t  analys is .  The philosophy i s  to a t t empt  
to uncover  a s  many  of the ha rdware  and operat ional  problem a r e a s  a s  
poss ible  that  could cause  safe ty  problems.  Once a p rob l em i s  identified the 
solution i s  usual ly  a m a t t e r  of engineering.  That  i s  the r e a s o n  f o r  the m u l t i -  
pronged attack-a p rob lem that does not appea r  in the fa i lu re  mode  effects  
ana lys i s  (essen t ia l ly  a bottom-up approach)  m a y  appear  in  the fault  t r e e  
ana lys i s  (essen t ia l ly  a top-down approach)  and p rob lems  that do not appear 
in e i the r  of these  (both of which a r e  essent ia l ly  ha rdware  o r ien ted)  m a y  
appear  in the abo r t  ana lys i s .  
Severa l  potential safe ty  p rob lems  have been defined, including explosions in 
e a r t h  orbi t ,  e a r t h  impact  dur ing the t rans lunar  coas t  per iod,  des i rab i l i ty  for 
s epa ra t e  cryogenic s t o r age  fo r  e s s en t i a l  s y s t e m s  (APS and e l ec t r i c  power) ,  
etc.  A recommendat ion f o r  inclusion of a NERVA emergency  idle mode has 
been m a d e  to pe rmi t  a  wider  f lexibil i ty in abo r t  operat ions .  Additionally, 
i t  i s  r ecommended  that the 5-hour cooldown period l imi ta t ion fo r  the 
emergency  operat ion be el iminated.  However, this  ana lys i s  i s  not complete 
and m u s t  be continued a s  the des ign changes,  a s  the operat ions  change, a s  
ground r u l e s  change, and a s  abo r t  capabi l i t ies  become m o r e  definitive. 
3 . 1  CONTINGENCY PLANNING WORKSHEETS 
3 ,  I . 1 Introduction 
The contingency planning worksheets  (CPWS) a r e  a continuation of the 
rel iabil i ty ana lys i s  d i scussed  in Section 2. The flight c r i t i ca l  i t ems ,  
defined in the fa i lu re  mode effects ana lys i s  (Section 2. 3) and quantified in  
the cr i t ica l i ty  ana lys i s  (Section 2. 4), a r e  d i scussed  i n  th is  section. These  
flight c r i t i ca l  i t ems  a r e  a l s o  single fa i lu re  i t e m s  in  the single fa i lu re  
analysis  cur ren t ly  used in  the re l iabi l i ty  analysis .  There fore ,  these  i t ems  
a r e  components which, i f  they fai l ,  can cause  l o s s  of the mi s s ion  and 
perhaps  m o r e  important ,  can c r ea t e  a safety problem. 
Each  Slight c r i t i ca l  i t em  i s  identified, the effect on the Reusable  Nuclear 
Shuttle (RNS) i s  d i scussed ,  the applicable mi s s ion  phase i s  identified, the 
fa l lur  e type i s  categorized,  the probabil i ty i s  l i s ted,  any  secondary effects 
a r e  identified, possible cor rec t ive  action i s  l i s ted,  emergency  detection 
requ i rements  a r e  identified, and the operational  mode  requ i rements  a r e  
identified. 
The component identification can be used to identify the specific component 
under d i scuss ion  by r e f e r ence  to the s y s t e m  d i ag rams  in  Section 2. 3. The 
operational  phases  a r e  l i s ted in  Table 3-1. The f a i l u r e  categor ies  a r e  
l is ted in  Table 3-2. The probabil i t ies l is ted on the CPWS w e r e  developed 
in Section 2. 4 and descr ibed  in  Section 2. 2. The value given i s  actually the 
probabil i ty of the fa i lu re  causing l o s s  of the mi s s ion  divided by one mill ion.  
Secondary effect f a c to r s  a r e  outside influences which could d i rec t ly  o r  
indirectly cause  the fa i lure .  These  f ac to r s  normal ly  do not appear  i n  a 
re l iabi l i ty  ana lys i s  but a r e  important  and should be considered.  They do 
normal ly  appear  in  a fault t r e e  ana lys i s ,  which i s  contained in Section 3. 2. 
The possible cor rec t ive  act ions  r ep re sen t  the recommendat ions  by the 
re l iabi l i ty /safe ty  group to the design group fo r  re l iabi l i ty /safe ty  
improvements .  
Table 3 -  1 
RNS LUNAR MISSION OPERATIONAL PHASES 
Miss ion  Phase  Descr ipt ion 
- - - - - 
Trans lunar  injection 
Pu lsed  a f te r  cooling 
Mid cou r se  cor rec t ion  
Trans lunar  coast  
Inser t ion into el l ipt ical  orbi t  
Pulsed a f t e r  cooling 
Apolune plane change 
Pulsed  a f t e r  cooling 
Ci rcu la r iza t ion  a t  t a rge t  al t i tude 
Pulsed a f t e r  cooling 
Lunar  orbi t  operat ions  
Inser t ion into el l ipt ical  lunar  orbi t  
Pulsed a f te r  cooling 
Apolune plane change 
Pulsed a f te r  cooling 
T r a n s e a r t h  injection 
Pu lsed  aftercooling 
Midcourse  cor rec t ion  
T r a n s e a r t h  coast  
E a r t h  orbi t  cap ture  
Pulsed a f t e r  cooling 
Orbit  resupply and checkout operations 
Denotes NERVA thrust ing operat ion 
Table 3-2 
FAILURE CATEGORIES 
I F a i l u r e s  which do not r equ i r e  a n  abo r t  o r  significant a l t e ra t ion  of the 
no rma l  mi s s ion  plan and do not r e su l t  i n  the addition of single fa i lu re  
points to the system.  
11 Fa i lu r e s  which allow the s tage to continue a t  no rma l  ra ted  conditions, 
d o  not r equ i r e  a n  immedia te  abor t ,  but do introduce additional single 
future  points to the sys tem.  
11-A F a i l u r e s  that do not r equ i r e  any act ion to continue and 
complete the miss ion .  
11.-B F a i l u r e s  that  r equ i r e  some  act ion to allow continued normal  
operat ion but completion of the mi s s ion  i s  allowed. 
11-C F a i l u r e s  that allow n o r m a l  operation but a t  a  penalty to con- 
s u m a b l e ~  thereby c rea t ing  a si tuation where  mi s s ion  comple-  
tion m a y  not be  possible.  
i L 1  Fa i lu r e s  that  r e s u l t  in  the l o s s  of abil i ty to achieve o r  mainta in  normal  
conditions but wil l  allow operation a t  a reduced level .  
SV Fa i lu r e s  that  r e su l t  i n  a prompt  l o s s  of RNS control  o r  th rus t  capability, 
o r  prompt  des t ruc t ion  of the RNS. 
IV-R Fa i l u r e s  which r e su l t  in  l o s s  of control  of the flight path. 
IV-B F a i l u r e s  that  r e su l t  i n  complete l o s s  of engine operation 
except cooldown. 
I V - C  F a i l u r e s  that  r e su l t  in complete l o s s  of engine operation 
including cooldown. 
IV-D Fa i lu r e s  that r e su l t  in  p rompt  des t ruc t ion  of the RNS. 
V Fa i lu r e s  that r e s u l t  in  inability to p e r f o r m  e a r t h  o rb i t  o r  lunar  orbi t  
operations.  
The emergency  detection requ i rements  r e p r e s e n t  the recommendat ions  for 
i t ems  on the emergency  detection s y s t e m  l is t ,  i t e m s  that wil l  moni tor  the 
RNS and warn  of impending o r  actual  fa i lures .  The operational  mode r equ i r e -  
men t s  are l i s t ed  in de ta i l  in  the s e v e r a l  contingency plans contained in  
Section 3. 4. 
3. 1. 2  Discussion of Resul ts  
As d i scussed  previously  in Section 2. 6, a s e r i e s  of re l iabi l i ty  and safe ty  
recommendat ions  w e r e  made  to the design groups  in  the cou r se  of the 
P h a s e  111 Study. These ,  in  general ,  w e r e  for  the  addition of redundant 
components to e l iminate  functional single fa i lu res .  The re l iabi l i ty  block 
d i a g r a m s  (shown in  Section 2. 5 )  r ep re sen t  the inclusion of many  of these  
recommendat ions .  In general ,  the one fa i lu re  mode  that  i s  difficult, i f  not 
impossible  to e l iminate  by redundancy, i s  external  leakage;  in fact ,  the 
addition of para l l e l  redundant components to e l iminate  functional single fa i l -  
u r e s  (e. g . ,  f a i lu re  to open) i nc r ea sed  the possibil i ty of ex te rna l  leakage.  
There fore ,  m o s t  of the i t e m s  on these  shee t s  a r e  for that type of fa i lu re  and,  
in  general ,  the recommendat ion i s  fo r  improved design,  specifically,  
mul t ip le  s ea l s  or  bet ter  s ea l s  and welded connections whe re  possible.  
Improved propellant  contamination requ i rements  (specif icat ions)  a r e  a l so  
recommended in  r e sponse  to the s ta t i s t i cs  that  this  problem i s  a ma jo r  
1 
cause  of sea l  leakage.  F o r  the aux i l i a ry  propulsion sys t em (APS) a 
s epa ra t e  redundant APS i s  recommended whereby leakage in  one sy s t em 
would not affect  the other  sys tem.  
The contingency planning work  shee t s  a r e  the re fore  displayed in  two 
groups-a group which does  not include the ex te rna l  leakage fa i lu re  m o d e  
and i s  consis tent  with the re l iabi l i ty  predictions of Tables  2-3  and 2-4 ,  
and a second group of CPWS which contains the i t ems  where  the  ex te rna l  
leakage would be  a problem if adequate des ign solutions a r e  not obtained, 
3 .  1. 3 Contingency Planning Work Sheets-Group 1 
This  sect ion contains the contingency planning work shee t s  that have viable 
fa i lu re  modes  other  than, o r  in  addit ion to, leakage.  

Form No. '830380 (1 1-70) 
MISSION: Lunar  Shuttle 
CLASS: 1 Hybrid and 3 
MODULE: Propel lant  
CONTINGENCY PLANNING WORK SHEET 
SYSTEM: Fill 
KSSIBLE 
CORRECTIVE 
Loss  of ullage pressurization 
Provide ground power only to prevent 
t ransfer  LH2 to the propul- valve f rom coming open during flight. 
sion module. Provide  check disconnect 
Poss ib le  Loss  Provide  check disconnect. 
Improve design 
t ransfer  LH2 to the propul- 
s ion module. 
EtilERGENCY 
DETECTION 
REQUIREMENTS 
Ullage p r e s s u r e  
LH2 liquid level 
Valve position 
Ullage p r e s s u r e  
LH2 liquid level  

Form No. '830-380 ( 1  1-70) 
CONTINGENCY PLANNING WORK SHEET 
Ullage p re s su re  
LH2 liquid level  
Valve position 
Provide ground power to vent valve,  
design relief valve so  that  it i s  inoper- 
ative i n  flight. 
Poss ib le  Loss Improve sea l  design Ullage p re s su re  
Provide check disconnect. LH2 liquid level 

Form No. '830-380 11 3-70) 
MISSION: Lunar Shuttle 
CLASS: 1 Hybrid and 3 
MODULE: Propulsion 
CONTINGENCY PLANNING WORK SHEET 
SYSTEM: Propellant Fil l  
POSSIBLE 
Resupply of propulsion 
module is not possible. 





Form No. '830.380 ( 1  1-701 
CONTINGENCY PLANNING WORK SHEET 
CRITICAL POSSIBLE EMERGENCY 
Actua l  Loss  
36.01.04.  11 Inability to p r e s s u r i z e  LOX 
o r  LHz tanks,  which p r e  - 
vents t r a n s f e r  of LOX o r  
LHz to turbopumps.  
L o s s  of attitude control  






3 ,  1. 4 Contingency Planning Work Sheets - '  Group 2 
This  section contains the contingency planning work shee ts  for the i t ems  with 
exte:rnah leakage a s  the only flight cr i t ical  fa i lu re  mode. 






Form No. '830-380 (11-701 
Possible Loss Ullage p re s su re  
Loss of ullage o r  LH2 Leak detection sys t em LH2 liquid level 
through fill valve could 

Form No. '830-380 11 1-70) 
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Form No. '830-380 (11-701 
CONTINGENCY PLANNING WORK SHEET 
CRITICAL 
Poss ib le  Loss 
P re s su r i za -  
Loss of LHZ could crea te  
inability to complete 
mission o r  cooldown. 

Form No. +830-380 ( 1  1-70) 
CONTINGENCY PLANNING WORK SHEET 



Farm No. '830.380 I 1  1-70] 
CONTINGENCY PLANNING WORK SHEET 
Possible Loss 
Provide  leak  detection sys t em 
phases.  Loss of ullage 
p re s su re  o r  LHZ could cause 
















3 , 2  FAULT T R E E  ANALYSIS 
A par t i a l  fault  t r e e  ana lys i s  was  per formed  during the P h a s e  I11 study a s  a n  
aid a ~ d  supplement to the remainder  of the re l iabi l i ty  and safety work,  
Definition of the complete fault t r e e  a t  th is  t ime  was  beyond the available 
manpower capability. It was  fel t ,  however, that  the t r e e  should be initiated 
and continued through subsequent project  phases ,  and i t  should be performed 
in  such  a manne r  that  i t  would provide visibil i ty in ce r ta in  c r i t i ca l  a r e a s .  
Th ree  genera l  a r e a s  w e r e  studied: (1 )  the top leve l  t r e e ,  which del ineates  
the genera l  p rob lem a r e a s  i n  the operat ion of the  RNS; ( 2 )  the p rob lem of 
e a r t h  impact  of radioactive deb r i s ,  which would be caused by malfunctions 
in ea r th  orbi t  and ( 3 )  the p rob lem of l o s s  of tank p r e s s u r e ,  which r e su l t s  in  
the inability to s t a r t  the NERVA o r  cause s  turbopump cavitat ion dur ing 
operation. 
3 .  2.  1 - Faul t  T r e e  Methodology 
The fault t r e e s  which a r e  p resen ted  i n  this  sect ion a r e  represen ted  by the 
following symbols :  
E V E N T  REPRESENTATIONS 
The reci;a.ngle identif ies an  event that r e su l t s  f r o m  
the combination of fault events through the input 
logic gate. 
The rec tang le  i s  a l s o  used to de sc r ibe  a conditional d 
input l o  an INHIBIT GATE. It indicates  a condition 
that  i s  p resumed to ex i s t  f o r  the l ife of the sys tem.  
The c i r c l e  de sc r ibe s  a bas i c  fault  event that  r equ i r e s  
no fu r ther  development. F requency  and mode of 
fa i lu re  of i t ems  s o  identified a r e  der ived f r o m  
empi r  ical data.  
The diamond desc r ibe s  a fault  event that  i s  considered 
bas ic  i n  a given fault  t r ee .  The poss ible  causes  of the 
event a r e  not developed e i ther  because  the event i s  of 
insufficient consequence or  the n e c e s s a r y  information 
i s  unavailable. 
The oval i s  used  to r e c o r d  the conditional input to a n  
INHIBIT GATE. It defines the s ta te  of the s y s t e m  that  
pe rmi t s  a faul t  sequence to occur ,  and m a y  be  e i ther  
no rma l  to the s y s t e m  or  r e su l t  f r o m  fa i lu res .  I 
The house ind ica tes  a n  event that  i s  normal ly  expected 
to occur  such a s  a phase  change i n  a dynamic sys tem.  
The t r i ang les  a r e  used a s  t r ans f e r  symbols.  A l ine 
f r o m  the apex  of the t r iangle  indicates  a " t rans fe r  i n f1  
and a l ine  f r o m  the s ide  denotes a " t r ans f e r  out. 
The double diamond i s  used  i n  the simplif ication of 
a fault  t r e e  fo r  numer ica l  evaluation. The event 
descr ibed  r e su l t s  f r o m  the cause s  that  have been 
identified but a r e  not shown on a par t i cu la r  ve r s ion  
of the fault  t r e e .  
LOGIC OPERATIONS Output A 
AND GATE desc r ibe s  the logical  operat ion whereby the  f I 
coexistence of a l l  input events i s  requ i red  to produce 
the output event. Inputs Output 
1 
PRIORITY AND GATE p e r f o r m s  the s a m e  logic .(-,/-------" ( P r i o r i t y  
function a s  the AND GATE with the addit ional  
st ipulation that  sequence a s  well a s  coexistence 
Inputs 
i s  required.  Output 
OR GATE defines the si tuation whereby the  output 
event will ex i s t  if one o r  m o r e  of the input events 
ex i s t s ,  
Input 
Output 
EXCLUSIVE OR GATE functions a s  an OR GATE 
with "the res t r ic t ion  that specified inputs cannot 
co-exist, 
Input s 
INHIBI'T GATES descr ibe  a casual relationship between one fault and another. 
The input event directly produces the output event if the indicated condition i s  
satisfied, The conditional input defines a s ta te  of the sys tem that permits  
the fault sequence to occur, and m a y  be either normal  to the sys tem or  resul t  
f rom failures.  It i s  represented by an  oval i f  i t  descr ibes  a specific fai lure  
m o d e  and a rectangle if i t  descr ibes  a condition that may exist for the life of 
" z h e  system. 
Output 
I 
Output 
Input 1nput 
The system used in this analysis i s  the sys tem represented by the figures 
contained in Section 2. 3. 
3 ,  2 ,  2 Discussion of Results 
The fault t r e e  i s  incomplete; therefore,  a complete evaluation of the design 
is not possible. The full value of a fault t r e e  becomes apparent when i t  i s  
performed simultaneously with the design effort, but then i t  i s  in a continuous 
process  of change. Hence, a repor t  a t  a specific t ime only shows the s tate  
of the t r e e  a t  that point in the design evolution. For  example, the fault t r ee  
effort during this phase devoted some time to an  examination of the pre-  
pressurizat ion sys tem which was la te r  eliminated. The t r e e  a s  i t  exis ts  now 
is represented by the sheets in  Section 3. 2. 3 and i s  devoted to the develop- 
ment of the top level t ree,  the examination of the fai lures  in ear th  orbit  
which could cause reent ry  of radioactive particles,  and the investigation of 
the failures which cause los s  of LH2 to NERVA or  lo s s  of ullage p res su re  in 
the propulsion module. The development of the top level event i s  represented 
by the top level t r e e  and subtrees  1, 2, 3, 4, K, L, M, N, P, Q, F ,  and B. 
This  group of t r e e s  del ineates  general  type of fa i lu res  that  wil l  1ea.d t o  e i ther  
public exposure  to nuclear  haza rds  o r  in jury o r  death to space  persorinel, 
The f a i l u r e s  i n  ea r th  orbi t  which could cause  ea r th  impac t  a r e  delineated i n  
sub t r ee s  F ,  F-1,  F-3, M-1, B-1J, B-lW, B-1X, B-IT,  B-lU, B-BY, 
B-lAA, B- lAE,  and B-1AD. 
The sub t r ee s  that investigate the l o s s  of LH2 to the NERVA include B-1, 
B- lB ,  B-BF, B-lQ,  B- lR ,  and B-1H. 
A r een t ry  of the RNS o r  port ions of the RNS can  be caused by a si tuation in 
e a r t h  o rb i t  whe re  the RNS has  fa i led and i s  in  a r een t ry  condition. 
Additionally, a c a s e  could ex i s t  where  the abandoned RNS i s  not a s s i s t ed  by 
other  space  vehicles o r  cannot be helped because  the RTJS i s  not intact ,  The 
prob lem could a l s o  b e  caused by guidance f a i l u r e s  i n  the ti-anslunar injection 
phase,  the t r ansea r th  injection phase ,  o r  the e a r l h  orbi t  injection phase. 
Also, as shown in  the abo r t  ana lys i s  (Section 3. 31, the p rob lem could r e s u l t  
f r o m  cooldown fa i lu re  in  the  t r ans luna r  coast  phase.  Subtrees  F and M-4 
delineate the  fa i lu res  that  can cause  the  f i r s t  type of fa i lure ,  i. e . ,  fai lure in  
e a r t h  orbit .  As shown in  sub t ree  F ,  t h e r e  a r e  a number  of i t e m s  on the RNS 
which can explode o r  cause  explosions. These  include h igh-pressure  bott les 
on the command and control  module and the propulsion module. The prob-  
abi l i ty  of occur rence  of these  fa i lu res  can be reduced by redundant relief sy s -  
t e m s .  The payload ( sub t ree  PL) m u s t  a l so  be investigated f o r  th is  type of 
fa i lu re .  One l e s son  that  can be l e a rned  f r o m  this  analysis  i s  to  avoid explo- 
s ions  in  e a r t h  orbit.  It will be ex t r eme ly  difficult, if not impossible ,  to 
prevent  the r een t ry  and e a r t h  impact  of radioactive debr i s ,  and th is  debris 
will  impact  i n  a t ime  span of l e s s  than 1. 5 years .  
Another fa i lu re  that  can cause  r een t ry  of the RNS i s  the l o s s  of al t i tude 
control. As shown on sub t ree  M-1, th is  can be caused by l o s s  of the 
command and control  module and the propulsion module auxi l iary  propulsion 
sys t ems  dur ing m o s t  of the e a r t h  orbi t  operat ions ,  but the  l o s s  of the 
propulsion module APS alone dur ing the changing of the command and control 
module will cause  th is  to happen. L o s s  of at t i tude control  could make  i t  
difficult to p e r f o r m  a docking o r  grabbing maneuver  by other  space  vehic les  
to prevent  reen t ry .  Sub t rees  M-1 and below investigate this  problem. 
A third fa i lu re  by which the RNS could exper ience  difficulty in e a r t h  orbi t  
is  the unavailabil i ty of LH2 to the NERVA turbopumps a t  the c o r r e c t  p r e s s u r e  
dur ing the in i t ia l  s t a r t up  f o r  the T L I  maneuver .  This  si tuation could cause  
pump cavitation, which i s  a  potentially explosive fa i lu re .  Th is  si tuation a l s o  
exists for  o ther  m i s s i o n  phases ,  but the e a r t h  impac t  impl icat ions  a r e  not 
p resen t  f o r  those  phases .  Subtree  B-1 invest igates  the f a i l u r e s  which could 
cause  this  problem.  
The fault  t r e e  ana lys i s  should continue in  fu tu re  phases  of the RNS project  to 
expand the a r e a s  disc-ussed above and to invest igate  o ther  a r e a s  a s  they 
become important .  
The top-level  faul t  t r e e  and r e l a t ed  sub t r ee s  which we re  identified above a r e  
contained in  the following pages  of this  section.  
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3 .3  ABORT ANALYSIS 
3.  3. 1 Introduction 
The abo r t  ana lys i s  was  per formed  to provide the data n e c e s s a r y  to conceive 
and delineate a contingency plan - a plan of act ion which i s  ini t iated by  a 
fa i lu re  of the RNS a t  some  point i n  the miss ion.  The abo r t  analys is  answer s  
the questions:  (1) what kind of o rb i t  ( ea r th ,  l una r )  will r e su l t  if the RNS 
exper iences  a complete l o s s  of t h ru s t  capability, ( 2 )  what i s  the magnitude 
of the th rus t  capability available to the RNS f r o m  the  NERVA emergency  
mode  and f r o m  other  sou rce s  (APS, cooldown) and how should i t  be  used,  
(3)  what i s  the orbi t  which r e su l t s  a f t e r  the application of th is  additional 
thrust ,  and (4) what capability m u s t  be available to r e s c u e  the personnel  
aboard the RNS and r e t u r n  t hem to a safe  haven? A coro l la ry  question is: 
can a l o s s  of t h ru s t  capability cause  the RNS to impact  the sur face  of the 
e a r t h ?  It i s  obvious that  a guidance malfunction could cause  e a r t h  impact  
dur ing the t rans lunar  injection bu rn  ( P h a s e  F) and the  e a r t h  orbi t  injection 
burn (Phase  U),  but the study a l s o  revea led  that  a l o s s  of t h ru s t  capability 
dur ing the t r ans luna r  coast  (Phase  G )  could a l s o  cause  e a r t h  impact.  An 
identification of the mi s s ion  phases  used in  the  abor t  ana lys i s  i s  shown in 
Table 3-3, 
This  r epo r t  p r e sen t s  the r e su l t s  of a n  ana lys i s  to de te rmine  the RNS t r a -  
j ec to r ies  resul t ing f r o m  e a r l y  th rus t  termination.  The RNS maneuvers  
d i f fe r  f r o m  conventional chemica l  rocke t  maneuve r s  i n  that  tail-off and 
cooldown impulse  provide a significant pe r  centage of the requ i red  injection 
energy re la t ive ly  l a te  in  the t ra jec tory ,  The nominal m i s s ion  was  a r b i -  
t r a r i l y  scheduled fo r  e a r th  depa r tu r e  on January  1, 1980. The launch t ime  
and orbi t  ascending node location we re  chosen to min imize  the TLI  velocity 
requ i rement  and a l s o  provide a hyperbolic lunar  orbi t  with a n  i~lc l inat ion 
of 90  deg ree s ,  a  per i lune al t i tude of 60 nmi,  and a t r i p  t ime  of 108  hours .  
The re  i s  no guarantee  that  the t r a j ec to r i e s  resul t ing f r o m  this analysis  will 
be repeated fo r  other launch da tes  o r  t a rge t  conditions; however, the g r o s s  
behavior of the t r a j ec to r i e s  (apogee and per igee  al t i tudes v e r s u s  t ime )  should 
be  represen ta t ive .  
Table 3-3 
OPERATIONAL PHASES CONSIDERED FOR ABORT ANALYSIS 
Miss ion P h a s e  Descr ipt ion 
o F Trans luna r  injection 
G Pulsed  a f te r  cooling 
Midc ourse  cor rec t ion  
Trans lunar  coast  
@ H Inser t ion into el l ipt ical  orbi t  
I  Pu lsed  a f te r  cooling 
J Apolune plane change 
K Pulsed  a f te r  cooling 
0 L Ci rcu la r ize  a t  t a rge t  al t i tude 
Pu lsed  a f t e r  cooling 
Lunar  orbi t  operations 
Inser t ion into el l ipt ical  lunar  orbi t  
Pu lsed  a f te r  cooling 
Apolune plane change 
Pulsed  a f te r  cooling 
T r a n s e a r t h  injection 
Pu lsed  a f te r  cooling 
Midcourse  correctior: 
T r a n s e a r t h  coast  
E a r t h  orbi t  capture  
Pulsed a f t e r  cooling 
E a r t h  orbi t  resupply and checkout ope ra t ions  
@ IS enotes NERVA Thrust ing Operation 
P 
Data used in this analysis were  generated with the MDAC 3'866 (FLIP)  com- 
puter program. Due to the significant effects of lunar perturbations,  the 
two-body instantaneous orbit  pa ramete r s  provided a s  a part  of the nominal 
t ra jectory printout do not accurately represent  abort  t ra jector ies  that resul t  
f r o m  thrust termination during tail-off or  cooldown. F o r  these conditions, 
abort  t ra jector ies  were  generated using four-body simulation to obtain 
accurate  results.  
3. 3. 2 Translunar  Injection - Phase  F 
The t ranslunar  injection (TLI) burn, a s  used for this analysis,  s t a r t s  with the 
initiation of thrust  buildup and has a duration of 1759 seconds (end of full 
thrust) .  F igure  3-1 shows the apogee altitude of the ea r th  orbit  that would 
resu l t  f r o m  a premature  engine shutdown. Figure 3 - 2  shows the perigee 
altitude for  this orbit  a s  a function of t ime of thrust  termination. Perigee 
altitude has been ra i sed  f r o m  260 to 574 nmi during the TLI burn (it is raised 
to the lunar radius during subsequent thrust  tail-off and cooldown operations), 
Two general types of abort  maneuvers  a r e  available to r e tu rn  the RNS to a n  
acceptable ea r th  orbit: (1) an immediate re t rof i re  utilizing the NERVA 
Time of Thrust Termination ( ~ e c )  
Figure 3-1 APOGEE ALTITUDE HISTORY - PHASE F 
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Figure 3 -2 PERIGEE ALTITUDE HISTORY - PHASE F 
emergency mode thrust  to establish an  elliptical orbit with a perigee a t  
260 nmi and the idle mode to circular ize a t  perigee, and (2 )  a shutdown and 
coast to  apogee with a n  idle mode operation a t  apogee to lower the perigee 
to  260 m i ,  followed by an emergency mode burn a t  perigee. The apogee of 
the elliptical orbit resulting f r o m  the f i r s t  option i s  shown in Figure 3-3. 
The magnitude of the apogee burn for  the second option i s  shown i n  Figure 3-4 
and the  magnitude of the perigee burn i s  shown in Figure 3-5. The data shown 
in Figure 3 -5 also represent  the approximate amount of total velocity required 
for  the fir s t  option. 
The capability of the NERVA emergency mode during the translunar injection 
mode is  shown in Figure 3-5. The capability during the remainder  of the 
mission, in t e r m s  of the velocity increment available a t  the s t a r t  and end of 
a specific mission phase, i s  shown in Figure 3-6. 
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As shown in  F igu re  3-5  the velocity inc rement  requ i red  could be a s  high ;as 
9, 200 f t / sec .  There fore ,  if a  fa i lu re  occu r s  in  the l a s t  200 seconds of b u r n  
i t  would not be possible to c i rcu la r ize .  The resul tant  orbi t  f o r  both options 
will  be a n  e l l ipse  with a per igee  of 260 nmi  and some external  propulsion 
capability wil l  be  r equ i r ed  for rescue .  
An a l t e rna t e  abo r t  mode dur ing th is  l a t t e r  pa r t  of Phase  F would be to use 
the emergency  mode to continue the bu rn  and then abor t  to the moon, A cola] 
of approximately  6, 750 f t / s e c  would be  requ i red  to accompl i sh  this option. 
This requ i rement  i s  within the capability ofA the emergencyl id le  mode  
operation. 
3.  3. 3  Trans lunar  Coast  - P h a s e  G 
During tail-off and the f i r s t  few hours  of cooldown, the apogee al t i tude i s  
r a i s ed  to dis tances  where ,  if a  p r ema tu re  shutdown ( l o s s  of cooldo~vn th rus t )  
occu r s ,  the resu l tan t  abor t  e l l ipse  exper iences  extensive lunar  per turbat ions  
( s e e  F igu re  3 - 7 ) .  These  per turbat ions  a r e  bes t  i l lus t ra ted by the per igee  
al t i tude v e r s u s  th rus t  terminat ion t ime  graph  presented i n  F igure  3-8. The 
effect of the lunar  per turbat ions  i s  to ini t ial ly lower the per igee  al t i tude,  
with a n  e a r t h  impact  resul t ing i f  shutdown occurs  f r o m  1 to 3  hours  into the 
miss ion .  F o r  l a t e r  shutdown t imes ,  the per igee  al t i tude i n c r e a s e s  rapidly 
a s  d i scussed  below. The velocity requ i rement  to r a i s e  the per igee  al t i tude 
to 260 nmi  has  been de te rmined  fo r  two modes .  F o r  the f i r s t  mode,  the RNS 
i s  allowed to achieve apogee and the impuls ive  maneuver  i s  then per formed ,  
The cost  in  impuls ive  velocity i s  shown ( the  solid curve in  F igu re  3 - 9 )  a s  
a function of t ime  of th rus t  termination.  A t ime  period of approximately  
70 hours  will e lapse  during the coas t  to apogee i n  this  case .  A maneuver  
that  provides  some  per formance  gain i s  to immediate ly  c o r r e c t  the veloci.ly 
a f te r  the ea r ly  shutdown i s  observed.  This co r r ec t i on  cons i s t s  of e i ther  (1)  
subtract ing velocity ( r e t r o f i r e )  s o  that the apogee al t i tude of the l a s t  acceptable  
per igee  al t i tude i s  reached,  o r  ( 2 )  adding velocity to i n c r e a s e  apogee al t i tude 
to that which would be achieved i f  shutdown did not occur  until l a t e r  than 
3 hours  into the miss ion.  The cost  fo r  this  maneuver  i s  spproximated by 
the dashed l ine  in F igu re  3  -9. These  per formance  requ i rements  r ep re sen t  
a min imum,  s ince  the maneuve r s  a r e  initiated immediate ly  a f te r  the mai- 
function. At th is  point i n  the mi s s ion  the capabil i ty of the APS sys t em i s  
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approximately 40 f t /sec.  Therefore,  even for  this la t ter  mode, there exists 
a t ime between 1 to 3 hours where the APS propellant i s  not sufficient to 
r a i s e  the perigee to 260 nmi. Assuming that the APS or some other m e a n s  
of propulsion i s  used to r a i s e  the perigee to 260 nmi, the velocity required to  
c ircular ize a t  perigee i s  plotted a s  a function of t ime of abort  in  Figure 3-10, 
During the l a t e r  phase of cooldown (3 through 102 hours)  both apogee and 
perigee altitudes initially increase  and then become relatively stabile ( see  
Figures. 3-11 and 3-12). The perigees of these orbits reach the lunar 
distance of 220, 000 nmi and the apogees range f r o m  2, 000, 000 to 8, 000, 000 
nmi. It should be pointed out that this post-swingby perigee occurs  af ter  a 
flyby of the moon. An apogee maneuver i s  impract ical  for  these abort  orbits 
a s  i t  would take over a month before i t  could be executed. Assuming a perigee 
burn, the impulsive velocity to  establish a 260 nmi by the abort  perigee 
altitude orbit  has  been plotted i n  Figure 3 - 13. 
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If an  abort  to  lunar  orbit were  an acceptable mode of operation, a m o r e  
practical final orbit might be achieved. Figure 3-14 the lunar  closest  
approach distances a r e  presented a s  a function of t ime of abort. These data 
a l sc ,  indicate that for the mission selected there  i s  no premature engine 
shutdown that will cause a lunar impact. Assuming that a n  out-of-plane 
(relative to the space station) circular  orbit  i s  acceptable, the impulsive 
velocity required i s  shown in Figure 3-15 for  a perilune burn. A three-burn 
maneuver would cost a total of 5, 200 f t / s e c  and would resul t  in  a rendezvous 
with the space station. At this point in the mission, the velocity increment 
available f r o m  the NERVA emergency mode i s  approximatey 7, 650 f t / sec ,  
more than i s  required for  either the perigee burn to achieve a high ear th  
orbit or either lunar orbit injection option. 
The cri t ical  point in this phase i s  the period between 1 and 3 hours where a 
failure to continue cooldown will resu l t  in an ear th  impact. This could only 
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be  caused by a C la s s  IV-A, IV-C, o r  IV-D type of fa i lu re  ( s e e  Section 3-1, 1
fo r  definition of f a i l u r e  c l a s se s ) .  A C la s s  IV-A o r  IV-D would a l s o  rule out 
any  possibil i ty of preventing e a r t h  impac t  caused by inability to control the 
flight path. A Glass  IV-C f a i l u r e  would demand another sou rce  of propulsive 
capability - the aux i l i a ry  porpulsion system.  In the  p r e sen t  des ign  the APS 
capabil i ty i s  inadequate, i. e. , up  to 11 5 f t / s e c  i s  requ i red ,  while only 40 
f t / s e c  i s  available. 
3.  3 . 4  Lunar  Orbit  Injection - P h a s e s  H, I, J, K, L, M 
The f i r s t  bu rn  of the lunar  injection occu r s  a t  per i lune of the incoming hyper- 
bolic orbit .  Assuming a n  RNS weight of 316, 000 lb,  a NERVA specific 
impulse  of 825 seconds and a th rus t  l eve l  of 75, 000 lb ,  the  ini t ial  injection 
burn  i s  109 seconds long and provides  a n  impuls ive  velocity of 847 ft / 'sec 
a t  a cost  of 10, 000 lb of propellant. In F igu re  3-16, the apogee and apolune 
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radii are shown a s  a function of burn  time. F o r  the f i r s t  60 seconds of the 
burn an ea r ly  shutdown will r e su l t  in  the RNS leaving the lunar sphere  of 
influence and orbiting the ea r th  with a per igee a t  the lunar  dis tance and 
apogee a s  shown. F o r  abor t s  occurr ing af ter  80 seconds of burn t ime, the 
RNS wil l  be captured by the moon i n  an  orbit  with a perilune alt i tude of 
60 nmi and a n  apolune a s  i l lus t ra ted i n  the figure.  If an  abor t  occurs  between 
60  a n d  80 seconds, the vehicle motion i s  not accurately  defined by patched 
conic techniques and should be solved a s  a three-body problem. This was 
deemed beyond the scope of the presen t  study and postponed until a l a t e r  
phase of t h e  RNS development. 
The problem of how to be s t  u s e  the RNS af te r  a n  abo r t  has  been considered.  
If one adopts the philosophy of establishing a n  e a r t h  o rb i t  the velocity r equ i r e -  
men t s  would be s imi l a r  to the data  of F igure  3-17. F o r  the f i r s t  60 seconds,  
i t  has  been a s s u m e d  that the  injection would occur  near  peri lune,  a f te r  a 
lunar  flyby, but out of the moon ' s  sphe re  of influence. If a n  abo r t  we re  to 
occur  a f t e r  80 seconds i n  the burn,  the RNS would coast  i n  the orbit  until  the 
position i s  reached whe re  the de s i r ed  e a r t h  orbi t  i s  obtained with minimurn 
velocity expenditure. On the other hand, if the RNS a t tempts  to es iabl ish  an  
out-of-plane 60 nmi  c i r cu l a r  lunar  orbi t  by a single p rograde  burn,  the 
velocity requ i rement  i s  shown in  F igu re  3 -  18. A t h r ee  bu rn  manersver, 
including a continuation of the P h a s e  H burn,  would cost  up to 5, 200  f t / s e c ,  
The NERVA emergency  mode capabil i ty i s  7, 050 f t / s e c  a t  this  point which 
provides a confortable m a r g i n  fo r  the requ i red  velocity inc rement  fo r  e i ther  
lunar  option. 
In the plane change maneuver  (Phase  J ) ,  the orbi t  plane i s  rotated about t h e  
pole to shift  the ascending node. Assuming a weight of 306, 000 lb and the 
s a m e  propulsion p a r a m e t e r s  previously discussed,  a 30-degree node shift 
cos t s  approximately  963 f t / s e c  o r  11,  300 lb of propellant. The burn  l ime  
assoc ia ted  with the maneuver  i s  124 seconds.  F o r  the nominal  miss ion  the 
RNS lunar  o rb i t  plane i s  no rma l  to the ear th-moon l ine  a f t e r  24  hours  of 
orbit .  If the ascending node location (-270 deg ree s  a t  this  t ime )  i s  inc reased  
by the plane-change maneuver ,  a n  abo r t  during the burn could be handled b y  
waiting until the lunar  rota t ion (13 d e g r e e s l d a y )  provides another  coplaiiar 
opportunity with the plane no rma l  to the ear th-moon line. The velocity 
requ i rement  to es tabl ish  a n  e a r t h  orbi t  260 by 222, 000 nmi  i s  then about 
2, 100 f t l s e c  (6, 760 f t l s e c  i s  available f r o m  the NERVA emergency  mode) .  
Conversely,  i f  the plane change d e c r e a s e s  the ascending node loca.tion, the 
orbi t  waiting requ i rement  fo r  a coplanar condition i s  extensive and a non- 
coplanar abor t  to e a r t h  i s  performed.  A m o r e  p rac t ica l  abor t  mocle would 
be  to c i r cu l a r i ze  a per i l ine  which would cos t  1, 780 f t / s ec .  
However, the f inal  lunar  orbi t  would then be i n  a different  plane than the 
lunar  space station. A p r io r  operat ion to complete the plane change would 
be  requ i red  to place  the final orbi t  in the p roper  plane. F igu re  3-19 gives 
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Figure 3-19 LUNAR ORBIT PLANE CHANGE - PHASE J 
the amount of required plane change remaining a s  a function of fai lure  time 
and Figure 3-20 gives the required velocity requirement.  This type of 
operation requi res  two thrust  maneuvers-only one i s  allowed for  the NERVA 
emergency mode and the APS capability a t  this point in the mission 
(31. 4 f t / s ec )  i s  inadequate. An emergency idle mode could be utilized i f  i t  
i s  available, or  external r e scue  sys tems could be utilized. 
The final lunar injection maneuver (Phase  L) occurs  a t  perilune of the rotated 
24-hour lunar orbit. F o r  the previously defined propulsion pa ramer te r s  and 
a weight of 295, 000 lb, the AV requirement of 1, 860 f t l s e c  t ranslates  to  a 
burn  t ime of 211 seconds and a propellant expenditure of 19, 200 lb. 
In F igure  3-21 apolune altitude i s  plotted versus  t ime of abort. In Figure 
3 -22 the velocity required to complete the circularization m a n e w e r  i s  
presented. If the lunar orbit  i s  not acceptable, an  ear th  orbit with a 268-nmi 
perigee can be established. However, a s  in the abort  during node shift the 
geometry has shifted and could be as much a s  10 degrees  out of plane at the 
f i r  s t  opportunity for  establishing the des i red  ear th  orbit. The velo8city 
requirement should va ry  nonlinearly f r o m  approximately 2, 100 ft / s e c  for 
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abort  a t  the s t a r t  of the maneuver to 2, 670 f t l s e c  near  the end of the burn. 
The capability of the NERVA emergency mode i s  grea ter  than 5, 600 f t / s ec  
during this maneuver.  
3. 3. 5 Transear th  Orbit Injection (Phases  0 ,  P, Q, R, S, T )  
The t ransear th  orbit injection i s  s imi lar  to the lunar injection in that i t  a l so  
consists of three burns: a n  injection into a 24-hour elliptical orbit;  a node 
shift maneuver in the 24-hour orbit;  and the injection onto the t ransear th  
hyperbola a t  perilune of the 24-hour orbit. F o r  this analysis i t  has been 
assumed that the injection onto the hyperbolic orbit  i s  initiated a t  approxi- 
mately 12 o'clock on January 30, 1980. The perilune latitude and longitude 
of the 90-degree inclination, 24-hour ellipse and the full thrust  bur11 time 
were  selected to achieve a 72-hour t ransi t  t ime and 260-nmi ear th  a r r i v a l  
perigee altitude a t  an  inclination of 31. 5 degrees.  
RNS weight a t  the s t a r t  of the injection into the 24-hour departure  ellipse was 
174, 000 lb. The injection velocity requirement a t  1, 860 f t / s e c  costs 
approx imate ly  12, 000 lb  of propellant ,  a s suming  a speci f ic  impulse  of 825 
seconds with a t h ru s t  level  a t  75, 000 lb  and bu rn  t ime  of 129 seconds .  In 
F igu re  3-23 the apolune a l t i tude that  would be  at tained i n  c a s e  of a p r e m a t u r e  
shutdown has  been  plotted a s  a function of t ime  a t  th rus t  terminat ion.  The 
velocity r equ i r emen t  to es tab l i sh  a c i r cu l a r  o rb i t  a t  the 60-nmi per i lune by a 
r e t r og rade  maneuver  i s  shown in  F igu re  3-24. If e scape  f r o m  the lunar  
sphe re  of influence and es tab l i shment  of a n  e a r t h  orbi t  i s  r equ i red ,  the 
si tuation becomes  complex. Since the r e a s o n  f o r  es tabl ishing the 24-hour 
e l l ipse  i s  to achieve the c o r r e c t  depa r tu r e  geomet ry  by rota t ing the RNS 
orb i t  plane into the escape  hyperbola,  the a l ignment  between the abo r t  
e l l ipse  and d e s i r e d  escape  hyperbola wil l  be significant. If the node shift 
to be perLormed i s  negative,  the RNS can wai t  i n  orbi t  unti l  the r e g r e s s i o n  
r a t e  ( 1  3 deg lday )  provides  a coplanar  s i tuat ion that  wil l  r e su l t  in  a n  oppor-  
tunity to r e a c h  e a r t h  on a 72-hour t r an s f e r .  The velocity requ i red  fo r  this  
si tuation i s  shown in F igu re  3-25. On the other  hand, if the de s i r ed  node 
shift i s  posit ive,  the r e g r e s s i o n  r a t e  moves  the RNS orb i t  plane in the 
opposite d i rect ion tending to i n c r e a s e  velocity r equ i r emen t s .  Unless a 
re la t ively  long waiting period i s  acceptable ,  the velocity r equ i r emen t s  will 
be  significantly l a r g e r  than those  shown i n  F igu re  3-25. The resul t ing e a r t h  
orbi t  will have a pe r igee  of 260 n m i  and a n  apogee g r e a t e r  than the lunar  
d i s  Lance, 
It would appear  that the logical  abo r t  ac t ion f o r  a fa i lu re  dur ing the  inse r t ion  
into an e l l ip t ica l  lunar  orbi t  ( P h a s e  0) would be to p e r f o r m  a n  immedia te  
r e k o g r a d e  maneuver .  The emergency  mode  capabil i ty during this  phase  i s  
between 7, 900 and 8, 900 f t / s e c ,  again m o r e  than enough f o r  th is  maneuver .  
The second burn  (Pha.se Q)  t akes  place over  the lunar  pole and,  a s suming  a 
node shif t  of 30 deg ree s ,  co s t s  some  6, 000 l b  of propellant  to provide the 
required 963 f t / s e c .  Assuming a t h ru s t  l eve l  of 75, 000 lb, this  maneuver  
wil l  take 63 seconds  to pe r fo rm.  The velocity requ i rement  to complete  the 
maneuver  i s  shown v e r s u s  t ime  of shutdown in F i g u r e  3-26. A sa fe  60-nmi 
luna,r orbi t  could b e  achieved by per fo rming  a r e t r o g r a d e  injection a t  per i lune 
a t  a cos t  of 1, 860 f t / s ec .  F o r  achieving a n  e a r t h  orbi t ,  the ini t ial  node 
location d i scuss ion  of the previous  pa r ag raph  appl ies  with a favorab le  location 
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costing approximately  1, 300 f t l s e c  and an  unfavorable location being m o r e  
costly. It would appear  the m o s t  a t t r a c t i ve  ac t ion  would bc  a r e t u rn  to a 
l una r  sa fe  haven. The cos t  i s  1, 860 f t / s e c ,  a s  compared  to the N E K V A  
emergency  mode  capabil i ty of between 7, 500 and 7, 900 f t / s e c .  A p r e l im ina ry  
burn  to  cancel  out the node shif t  could b e  a t ta ined with the NERVA id le  m o d e ,  
The th i rd  burn  ( P h a s e  S)  p laces  the RNS on the t r a n s e a r t h  hyperbola,  The 
t h ru s t  prof i le  cons i s t s  of a 56-second buildup, a 32. 5-second full  t h ru s t  
phase,  and a 34-second per iod with a constant  45, 000-lb t h ru s t  followed b y  
tail-off,  with cooldown te rmina t ing  a t  12. 26 hours.  The t r a n s e a r t h  injection 
burn  and the resul t ing t r a j e c t o r i e s  a r e  analogous to the s i tuat ions  encourltered 
in p r e m a t u r e  shutdown a b o r t s  f o r  the t r an s luna r  injection burn.  The abo r t  
t r a j e c to r i e s  f r o m  the t r a n s e a r t h  injection burn  can be grouped in  two ca te -  
gor ies :  (1 )  those  that  orbi t  the moon  with shutdown occu r r i ng  between 0 3 r d  
62 seconds  into the bu rn  and ( 2 )  those  which escape  the moon  when engine 
shutdown o c c u r s  l a t e r  than 62 seconds.  They a r e  d i scussed  in  the following 
paragraphs .  
3. 3. 5. 1 Abor t s  Result ing in  Lunar  Orb i t s  
Apolune and per i lune a l t i tudes  have been  plotted a s  a function of t i m e  o f '  
t h ru s t  t e rmina t ion  and a r e  p resen ted  i n  F i g u r e s  3-27 and 3-28. The slow 
change in  apolune a l t i tude r e f l e c t s  the t h ru s t  buildup phase. At approxi-  
ma t e ly  62 seconds  into the TEI maneuver  the abo r t  t r a jec to ry ,  which i s  
ini t ial ly a n  e l l ip t ica l  lunar  orbi t  is per tu rbed  by the e a r t h  s o  that  the ENS 
will  e s cape  the lunar  gravi ta t ion f ield and be  captured by the ea r th .  The 
per i lune a l t i tude h i s to ry  (F igu re  3-28) i l l u s t r a t e s  the effect of e a r t h  pe r t u r -  
bations on the lunar  orbit .  At apolune of the abor t  e l l ipse  the e a r t h ' s  
pe r tu rba t ions  d i s t o r t  the e l l ip t ica l  t r a j e c to ry  by reducing the per igee  rad ius  
and inc reas ing  the orbi t  eccentr ic i ty .  F igu re  3-29 i l l u s t r a t e s  the predic ted 
cost  of re -es tab l i sh ing  the 60-nmi per i lune a l t i tude by (1 )  a n  apolune 
maneuver  o r  ( 2 )  by a n  immedia te  velocity addit ion o r  subtract ion to rnaxin3ize 
o r  min imize  the e a r t h ' s  influence. The immedia te  maneuver  i s  the m o r e  
effect ive  approach,  with a n  impuls ive  velocity requ i rement  approxiniately 
one-half that  of the apolune maneuver .  The "sa fe  orbit"  would be  a 60-nmi 
c i r cu l a r  lunar  orbi t  f o r  shutdown occur r ing  before  56 seconds.  In F igu re  3 -30 ,  
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the velocity requ i rement  to c i r cu l a r i z e  the lunar  orbi t  a t  per i lune (assuming  
per i lune has been r a i s ed  to 60 nmi )  i s  shown. Abor t s  o.ccurring a f t e r  56 
seconds ,  .with e i the r  of the per i lune co r r ec t i ons  shown in  F i g u r e  3-24, r e su l t s  
in a n  e a r t h  o rb i t  and wil l  be  included i n  the following discuss ion.  
As shown in  F igu re  3-29, the APS velocity capabil i ty a t  this  t ime  i s  only 
2 2  f t / s e c ,  which is not nea r l y  enough to accompl i sh  the r equ i r ed  maneuver  
over  the full r ange  of the c r i t i c a l  t ime span. 
3 .  3, 5, 2 Abor t s  Result ing in  E a r t h  Orb i t s  
Apogee and per igee  a l t i tudes  resu l t ing  f r o m  engine shutdowns occur r ing  
l a t e r  than 62 seconds  into the bu rn  and dur ing the t r a n s e a r t h  coas t  ( P h a s e  T )  
a r e  presented in  F i g u r e s  3-31 and 3-32. Thrus t ,  i n  this  c a se  r e f e r s  to 
both no rma l  t h ru s t  conditions and t h ru s t  generated dur ing cooldown. The 
velocity requ i rement  to lower  pe r igee  al t i tude to the de s i r ed  value of 260 nmi 
i s  i l lus t ra ted  in F i g u r e  3-33. Assuming that the 260-nmi per igee  i s  at tained,  
the velocity r equ i r ed  to c i r cu l a r i z e  a pe r igee  i s  p resen ted  in  F igu re  3-34. 
3, 3 ,  6 E a r t h  Orbi t  Injection - P h a s e  U 
The RNS weighs approximately  148, 000 lb  a t  the ini t iat ion of th is  maneuver .  
Assuming a n  impuls ive  velocity r equ i r emen t  of 10, 200 f t l s e c ,  a  t h ru s t  
l eve l  of 75, 000 lb and a speci f ic  impulse  of 825 seconds ,  the t i m e  to pe r fo rm  
the maneuver  i s  525 seconds.  The  apogee al t i tude of the abo r t  e l l ipse  with a 
260-nmi per igee  a l t i tude i s  shown f o r  p r e m a t u r e  shutdown i n  F igu re  3-35. 
If the o rb i t  i s  c i rcu la r ized  a t  a subsequent per igee ,  the velocity requ i rement  
wi i i  be that shown in F igu re  3-36. However,  a s  shown in  F igu re  3-36, the 
avai lable  velocity i nc r emen t  f r o m  the NERVA emergency  mode i s  considerably  
l e s s  than the velocity requ i rement .  This  is obvious when i t  is considered 
that  the  velocity r equ i r emen t  i s  predicated on a speci f ic  impulse  of 825 
seconds  and the NERVA emergency  mode  speci f ic  impulse  is 500 seconds.  
The ex te rna l  r e s c u e  propulsion r equ i r emen t s  would be  essen t ia l ly  twice the  
d i f l e rence  between the velocity r equ i r emen t  and the NERVA emergency  mode  
capabil i ty (F igu re  3-36). The velocity r equ i r emen t s  a r e  a l s o  based upon a n  
assumpt idn  that no plane change maneuve r s  a r e  required.  However,  t h e r e  
wil l  be  re la t ive  nodal r e g r e s s i o n  r a t e s  which w i l l  have to be  accounted fo r  in 
the ac tua l  situation. 
Figure 3-31 APOGEE ALTITUDE HISTORY -PHASES S AND T 
Time of Thrust Termination (See) 
Figure 3-32 PERIGEE ALTITUDE HISTORY - PHASES S AND T 
100 1000 10,000 100 ,'OOO 
Time of Thrust Termination ( ~ e c )  
Figure 3-33 VELOCITY REC$JIRPfEPIT TO LOWER PERIGEE TO 260 IWI - PHASE T 
Time of Thrust Termination (Sec) 
Figure 3-34 VELOCITY REQUIREMENT TO CIRCULARIZE AT 260 NM 
PERIGEE - PHASE T 
Time of Thrust Termination (Sec) 
Figure 3-36 ABORT VELOCITY REQUIREMENTS - PHASE U 
3,  3. 7 Externa l  Rescue Capability 
- 
Postulat ing a n  RNS thrus t  l o s s  a t  any given point in  the lunar  shutt le m i s s ion  
identifies a range  of conditions over  which r e s c u e  m a y  be required.  Rescue  
velocity r equ i r emen t s ,  based on depa r tu r e  f r o m  and r e t u r n  to e a r t h  o r  lunar  
c i rcu la r  orbit ,  a r e  indicated in Table 3-4. 
The r e scue  orb i t s  a r e  specified i n  t e r m s  of per igee/apogee a l t i tudes ,  and 
r e scue  veloci t ies  ( to ta l )  p r e sume  equal-out-equal-back requ i rements .  In 
accordance  with the NASA study guidelines, the tug has the following 
cha rac t e r i s t i c s ,  a s  specified in  the NASA guidelines and constra ints  
documents.  
P ropuls ion  Module 
Iner t  ( lb)  10, 000 
Propel lant  Capacity ( lb)  60, 000 
Specific Impulse  ( s e c )  46 0 
Ins t rument  Module 2,000 
The total velocity capability of the tug (ideal ,  excluding gravi ty  l o s s e s )  
based  on no payload out, i s  18, 100 f t / s e c  and 19, 600 f t / s e c  for  r e t u r n  pay- 
ioacis of 20, 000 and 15, 000 lb, respecit ively.  This  capabil i ty i s  s een  to be 
m o r e  than adequate i'or r e scue  out of lunar  orbi t  dur ing the LO1 and TEI  
maneuvers ,  and sufficient for  r e scue  out of e a r t h  orbi t  fo r  m o s t  of the T L I  
anc? EOI maneuvers .  
Two options a r e  seen  during the l a t t e r  port ion of the T L I  maneuver :  ( 1 )  
r e tu rn  to an ell ipt ical  e a r t h  orbi t  and ( 2 )  capture  i n  an  el l ipt ical  lunar  orbit .  
Then a second tug would complete the operation of re turning the RNS to low 
c i r cu l a r  orbi ts .  The l a t t e r  of the two options i s  significantly l e s s  costly. 
A third approach  could be to r e tu rn  the mi s s ion  c rew to e a r t h  following 
rendezvous of the lunar  r e scue  vehicle. 

3 - 4  GONTINGENCY PLAN 
A flight safety contingency plan was  developed fo r  the lunar  shutt le  miss ion.  
The plan that  i s  deta i led  in  th is  sect ion was  developed fo r  the Class  1 
Hybrid RNS but i s  a l s o  applicable f o r  the Class  3 RNS. 
The contingency plan i s  a  continuation of the flight safety ana lys i s  d i scussed  
previously.  The types of a b o r t s  we re  d i scussed  in  Section 3. 3 and the 
general abo r t  modes  delineated in th i s  sect ion we re  der ived  f r o m  that  
ana lys i s .  The c l a s s e s  of f a i l u r e s  w e r e  used in  the contingency planning 
work sheets ,  which we re  p resen ted  in  Section 3. 1. The contingency planning 
work shee t s  deta i l  the ac tua l  component f a i l u r e s  that fa l l  into these  
c?a s  sif icat ions,  while the contingency plan del ineates  the act ion that will be  
taken when one of these  f a i l u r e s  occur .  
It must  be pointed out that  th i s  i s  not a f inal  product .  As  m o r e  deta i l  s tudies  
a r e  made on the t r a j e c to r i e s ,  m o r e  speci f ic  ground ru l e s  a r e  adopted, and 
m o r e  deta i l  and specif ic definitions of RNS emergency  operat ional  modes  
a r e  made, th is  contingency plan will change. However, th is  i s  fel t  to be a 
viable plan under the c u r r e n t  l eve l  of m i s s ion  and s y s t e m  definition and 
ground ru les .  
3 ,  4, h Ground Rules,  Assumptions ,  and Definitions 
The ground r u l e s  and assumpt ions  used in  th is  ana lys i s  a r e  a s  follows: 
A. The NERVA engine h a s  s e v e r a l  l eve l s  of operat ions:  
1. Rated conditions 
2.  Throt t le  mode 
3. Malfunction mode 
4. Emergency  mode 
5. Idle mode 
The r a t ed  condition, throt t le  mode, and malfunction mode a r e  a l l  
a t  r a ted  specif ic impulse  (825 seconds)  but different  l eve l s  of 
th rus t .  The emergency  mode and the idle mode a r e  a t  a  reduced 
specif ic impulse  (500 seconds)  and a lower  l eve l  of th rus t .  The 
throt t le  mode and malfunction mode a r e  not used explici t ly in th is  
analysis-the throt t le  mode i s  a  non-malfunction mode and the 
malfunction mode i s  a  r e su l t  of a  C l a s s  II-C fa i lu re .  The 
emergency  mode i s  defined in  the NERVA p r o g r a m  r equ i r emen t s  
Document (NPRD) a s  a  mode with a  t h ru s t  of 30, 000 lb, a  specif ic 
8 impulse  of 500 seconds,  and a  to ta l  impulse  of 10 lb - sec .  The  
emergency  mode r equ i r emen t s  will be provided in a  single engine 
cycle and mus t  be a t ta inable  f r o m  a l l  opera t ing modes  o f  the engine 
cycle.  If the malfunction o c c u r s  during no rma l  s teady-s ta te  
operation,  immedia te  r e t r e a t  to  an  emergency  mode will be made.  
If the malfunction o c c u r s  during engine modes  following the s teady-  
s t a te  power mode, provis ions  will be  made fo r  cooling up to 5 Elours 
before  en te r ing  a n  emergency  mode.  
The re  a r e  two identified NERVA idle modes,  a  mode where  turbo-  
pump operat ion i s  r equ i r ed  and a  mode where  tank p r e s s u r e  i s  used 
fo r  the driving fo r ce .  It i s  a s s u m e d  in th i s  ana lys i s  that th i s  l a t t e r  
mode i s  available a s  a n  addit ional  emergency  mode. This  a s sump-  
tion al lows a  much  g r e a t e r  flexibility in the abo r t  maneuvers  a t  a 
s m a l l  cos t  ( i f  any)  i n  engine design.  The only requ i rement  i s  that 
one flow path be available (e i the r  the n o r m a l  path through the PSOV 
va lves  o r  the cooldown path through the CSOV/ CSCV va lve s )  and 
that t he r e  i s  sufficient control  of the control  d r u m s  to achieve 
cr i t ica l i ty .  
B. Two safe  havens  a r e  available,  a  260-nmi c i r c u l a r  e a r t h  orbi t  and 
a  60-nmi c i r c u l a r  lunar  orbi t .  It i s  a s sumed  that  the RNS in a  
260-nmi c i r c u l a r  e a r t h  o rb i t  can  rendezvous  with a  space  station, a 
space  tug o r  a  ground based launch vehicle.  Any o ther  orbi t  will 
r equ i r e  ex te rna l  r e s cue .  It i s  a s s u m e d  that  any lunar  o rb i t  except  
the 60-nmi c i r c u l a r  o rb i t  containing the l una r  o rb i t  space  s ta t ion 
will r equ i r e  ex t e rna l  r e s cue .  
C .  The c r e w  capsule  will r e m a i n  with the RNS to await  r e s cue  i f  
poss ible .  The capsule  does  not have a n  e a r t h  r e e n t r y  capability but 
does  have a  21 -day  life suppor t  capabil i ty.  It i s  a s sumed  that t he r e  
i s  no propulsion capabil i ty on the capsule ,  but a  requ i rement  foi- 
th i s  capabil i ty i s  indicated in one abo r t  maneuver  (Phase  S). 
D. The p r io r i ty  on a n  abo r t  maneuver  i s  f i r s t  to p ro tec t  the earth. 
population and second to p ro tec t  the RNS c rew.  This  becomes  a  
p rob l em in Phase  G.  
E, It i s  a s sumed  that C lass  IV-A fa i lures  ( loss of control  of the flight 
path) will be detected before  a substant ia l  change in the flight path 
i s  exper ienced.  This  assumpt ion  mus t  be ver i f ied  a t  a  l a t e r  date 
when the safety s y s t e m  and ground support  r equ i r emen t s  a r e  
defined. The fa i lu re  ca tegor ies  we re  l i s t ed  e a r l i e r  in Table 3-2. 
3 ,  4, 2 Abort  Actions 
The abor t  act ion fo r  a Class  I  f a i lu re  ( fa i lu res  which do not introduce 
addit ional  single fai lures-essential ly the l o s s  of equipment which cannot 
effect m i s s ion  s u c c e s s )  i s  the s a m e  fo r  a l l  mission.phases-continue miss ion  
a s  planned. 
The abor t  ac t ion f o r  a Class  I1 fa i lu re  i s  a  function of the subc l a s s  of fa i lu re  
and t h e  miss ion  phase .  The action fo r  a C l a s s  IIA fa i lu re  ( fa i lu res  which 
do not requ i re  any act ion to complete  the mission--essentially the fa i lu re  of 
one of an on-line redundant s e t  of components)  i s  the s a m e  fo r  a l l  miss ion  
phases-continue mi s s ion  a s  planned. The act ion fo r  a Class  IIB fa i lu re  
( fa i lu res  that r equ i r e  some  action to al low completion of the mission- 
essen t ia l ly  the fa i lu re  of a component which i s  backed up by a standby redun- 
dant component)  i s  the s a m e  fo r  a l l  m i s s ion  classes-ini t iate command to 
p e r f o r m  action requ i red  to r e s t o r e  s y s t e m  to no rma l  operat ions  and then 
continue mi s s ion  a s  planned. If a  Class  IIA o r  IIB fa i lu re  o c c u r s  on the 
outbound port ion of the t r i p  (on the way to the moon) a question a r i s e s -  
shoald the RNS be allowed to leave the moon on the r e t u r n  t r i p  if it contains 
a single fa i lu re  i t em?  If the answer  to  th is  question i s  ' 'NO", then the action 
s ta ted  above should be fu r t he r  defined to include-abort the mi s s ion  a t  the 
lunar  ba se  and r e p a i r  o r  d i s ca rd  the RNS.  
The Class  IIC f a i l u r e s  ( fa i lu res  that al low n o r m a l  operat ion but a penalty to 
consumables )  we re  fu r t he r  divided in two subclasses-Class I1 C-1  where  the 
penalty i s  a  m ino r  one cha rac t e r i z ed  by a reduction to  the malfunction mode 
operat ion and C la s s  I1 C-2 where  the penalty is a ma jo r  one cha rac t e r i z ed  
by a major ,  but not ca tas t rophic ,  leakage fa i lu re .  The action fo r  a C l a s s  I1 
C - . l  fa i lure  i s  to continue the mi s s ion  a s  planned and add consumables  a t  the 
lunar  base  i f  the fa i lu re  occu r r ed  on the outbound leg. The r e s t r i c t i on  on 
leaving the lunar  ba se  with a single fa i lu re  d i scussed  above might apply to 
th is  fa i lure  c lass i f ica t ion.  
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The ac t ion  f o r  a  C l a s s  I1 C-2 f a i l u r e  would be to r e t u r n  to a  safe  haven a s  
soon a s  poss ib le ,  In g e n e r a l  the speci f ic  ac t ions  would be  the  s a m e  a s  
defined in  Table  3 - 5  f o r  the  C l a s s  I11 f a i l u r e s  except  i n  the l a t e r  por t ions  
of the t r a n s l u n a r  in jec t ion  phase  and the  e a r l y  por t ions  of the t rans lunai -  
c o a s t  the  ac t ion  might  be t o  r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h  and in  the  e a r l y  por t ions  of the 
t r a n s e a r t h  c o a s t  phase  the ac t ion  might  be to  r e t u r n  to  the  moon. The deta i l  
ope ra t ions  dur ing  the o t h e r  p h a s e s  might  change t o  d e c r e a s e  the t i m e  
r e q u i r e d  t o  r e a c h  a  sa fe  haven o r  a n  o rb i t  f r o m  which r e s c u e  c a n  be e a s i l y  
accompl i shed .  
The ac t ion  f o r  C l a s s  I11 f a i l u r e s  ( f a i l u r e s  that  r e q u i r e  reduct ion  to  opera t ion  
a t  the  NERVA e m e r g e n c y  m o d e )  a r e  outlined in  Table  3-5.  
The ac t ion  f o r  C l a s s  IV f a i l u r e s  i s  a  function of the s u b c l a s s  of f a i lu re  and 
speci f ic  c a s e s ,  the  m i s s i o n  phase .  The ac t ion  f o r  a  C l a s s  IV A f a i l u r e  
( l o s s  of con t ro l  of the  flight pa th)  i s  to  shut  down the  NERVA in  a  rapid  but  
nondes t ruc t ive  m a n n e r  and then t o  s e p a r a t e  the c r e w  capsu le .  This  
r ecommenda t ion  and a s s u m p t i o n  n u m b e r  5  ( that  th i s  type of f a i l u r e  can  be 
de tec ted  be fo re  a  subs tan t i a l  change in  the  flight path i s  exper ienced)  s5ould 
p reven t  the  RNS f r o m  impact ing  the  e a r t h  on the  t r a n s l u n a r  inject ion b u r n  
and the  e a r t h  o rb i t  in jec t ion  burn,  the t h e o r y  being to  t e r m i n a t e  t h r u s t  before  
a n  i m p a c t  t r a j e c t o r y  i s  genera ted .  The except ion  to  th i s  ac t ion  i s  iii the 
e a r t h  impac t  por t ion  of the t r a n s l u n a r  c o a s t  phase  ( s e e  Section 3. 3,  3 ) .  If 
the  f a i l u r e  o c c u r s  dur ing  th i s  phase,  the  r ecommenda t ion  i s  to continue the 
cool-down th rus t ing  i n  a m a n n e r  ( d i r e c t e d  by the c r e w  a n d / o r  ground con t ro l )  
t o  i n c r e a s e  o r  d e c r e a s e  the  ve loci ty  to a  va lue  ( s e e  F i g u r e  3 - 9 )  which wil l  
r e m o v e  the poss ib i l i ty  of e a r t h  i m p a c t .  The o the r  except ion  i s  a s i m i l a r  
s i tua t ion  dur ing  the t r a n s e a r t h  in jec t ion  phase  ( P h a s e  S) where  l u n a r  impac t  
i s  poss ib le .  A s i m i l a r  plan of act ion,  a s  d e s c r i b e d  above, would apply.  
The ac t ion  f o r  a  C l a s s  IV B f a i l u r e  (comple te  l o s s  of engine opera t ion  except  
cooldown) would be t o  shutdown and cool  NERVA o r  continue cooldowii in a 
n o r m a l  m a n n e r  and u t i l ize  the  cooldown t h r u s t  in a  m a n n e r  which will 
m i n i m i z e  the  amount  of e x t e r n a l  r e s c u e  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  An e x t e r n a l  rescue 
will, in  genera l ,  be  r e q u i r e d .  
Table  3 -5  
ABORT ACTIONS FOR CLASS I11 FAILURES 
Action 
Without E m e r g e n c y  
P h a s e  With E m e r g e n c y  Mode Mode 
T r a n s l u n a r  Abor t  t o  e a r t h .  Immedia te  E x t e r n a l  r e s c u e  with 
in jec t ion  (F- 1)  r e t r o  with e m e r g e n c y  mode,  e a r t h  space  tug 
c i r c u l a r i z e  a t  p e r i g e e  with 
0 to 1, 600 s e c  idle mode.  
T r a n s l u n a r  Abor t  t o  moon, u s e  e m e r g e n c y  E x t e r n a l  r e s c u e  with 
in jec t ion  ( F - 2 )  mode to  continue T L I  burn ,  u s e  l u n a r  space  tug 
-1, 6 0 0  t o  1, 759 s e c  id le  mode f o r  t h r e e  burns ,  a t  
moon  
T r a n s l u n a r  
c o a s t  (6) 
Abort  to  moon, u s e  e m e r g e n c y  E x t e r n a l  r e s c u e  with 
mode fo r  f i r s t  l u n a r  burn,  l u n a r  space  tug 
id le  mode fo r  plane change, 
(if r e q u i r e d )  and f o r  
c i r cu la r i za t ion .  
El l ip t ica l  l u n a r  Abor t  to  moon. Continue with E x t e r n a l  r e s c u e  with 
o rb i t  in jec t ion  (H) e m e r g e n c y  mode,  p e r f o r m  l u n a r  space  tug. 
r emain ing  two b u r n s  with idle 
mode.  
Coas t  i n  l u n a r  Abor t  t o  moon.  P e r f o r m  E x t e r n a l  r e s c u e  with 
e l l ip t i ca l  o rb i t  (I)  plane change b u r n  with idle l u n a r  s p a c e  tug. 
(before  plane mode,  c i r c u l a r i z a t i o n  with 
change ) e m e r g e n c y  mode.  
Plane  Change in  Abor t  to  moon. Continue E x t e r n a l  r e s c u e  with 
l u n a r  o rb i t  ( J )  plane change with e m e r g e n c y  l u n a r  space  tug. 
mode,  u s e  idle mode f o r  
c i r cu la r i za t ion .  
Coas t  in  e l l ip t i ca l  Abor t  to  moon. Use e m e r -  E x t e r n a l  r e s c u e  with 
l u n a r  o rb i t  (K),  gency mode t o  c i r c u l a r i z e  l u n a r  space  tug. 
( a f t e r  plane change)  
C i rcu la r i za t ion  a t  Abor t  t o  moon. Continue E x t e r n a l  r e s c u e  with 
60  nrni (L )  b u r n  with e m e r g e n c y  mode.  l u n a r  space  tug. 
Inject ion in  Abor t  t o  moon.  R e t r o  with E x t e r n a l  r e s c u e  with 
e l l ip t i ca l  l u n a r  e m e r g e n c y  mode back to  l u n a r  space  tug. 
o rb i t  (0) 60-nmi  c i r c l e .  
Table  3 -5  (page 2 of 2 )  
ABORT ACTIONS FOR CLASS I11 FAILURES 
Action 
Without Erne rgency 
P h a s e  With E m e r g e n c y  Mode Mode 
Coast  in  e l l ip t i ca l  Abor t  to  moon. C i r c u l a r i z e  E x t e r n a l  r e s c u e  with 
l u n a r  o r b i t  (P) with e m e r g e n c y  mode a t  l u n a r  space  tug. 
(before  plane change)  per i lune .  
P lane  change in  Abor t  to  moon. Null plane E x t e r n a l  r e s c u e  with 
l u n a r  o rb i t  (Q)  change with i m m e d i a t e  l u n a r  space  tug. 
e m e r g e n c y  mode,  c i r c u l a r i z e  
a t  pe r i lune  with idle mode.  
Coas t  in  e l l ip t i ca l  Abor t  to  moon. P e r f o r m  plane E x t e r n a l  r e s c u e  with 
l u n a r  o r b i t  (R)  change with id le  mode,  c i r c u -  l u n a r  space  tug. 
( a f t e r  plane change)  l a r i z a t i o n  with e m e r g e n c y  
mode.  
T r a n s e a r t h  Abor t  t o  moon.  R e t r o  to  E x t e r n a l  r e s c u e  -with 
in jec t ion  (S) e l l ip t i ca l  l u n a r  o rb i t  with lunar  space  tug. 
e m e r g e n c y  mode,  p e r f o r m  
plane change and c i r c u l a r i -  
zat ion with id le  mode.  
T r a n s e a r t h  c o a s t  Abor t  to  e a r t h .  P e r f o r m  E x t e r n a l  r e s c u e  with 
( T )  p a r t i a l  c i r c u l a r i z a t i o n  with e a r t h  space  tug 
e m e r g e n c y  mode.  E x t e r n a l  (two m a y  be  required) 
r e s c u e  with s p a c e  tug. 
E a r t h  o rb i t  Abor t  to  e a r t h .  Continue E x t e r n a l  r e s c u e  with 
in jec t ion  ( U )  c i r c u l a r i z a t i o n  with e m e r -  e a r t h  space  tug ,  
gency mode.  E x t e r n a l  (Two m a y  be r e q u i r e d ) .  
r e s c u e  with s p a c e  tug. 
The act ions  fo r  Class  IV C (complete  l o s s  of engine operat ion including 
cooldown) and C la s s  IV D f a i l u r e s  ( fa i lure  that  r e s u l t s  in  p rompt  des t ruc t ion  
of the RNS) i s  to s epa ra t e  the c r e w  capsule  a s  rapidly a s  poss ible  and await  
r e s cue  f r o m  a n  ex t e rna l  source .  The r equ i r emen t s  f o r  ex te rna l  r e s cue  and 
the capabil i ty of the space  tug a r e  d i scussed  in Section 3. 4. 3,  
The action fo r  a Glass  V fa i lu re  ( fa i lu res  that  occu r  in e a r t h  o r  lunar  o rb i t )  
would be to r e p a i r  o r  d i s ca rd  the RNS. 
3 - 5  SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS 
One of the r e su l t s  of the flight safe ty  ana lys i s  i s  a s e r i e s  of recommendat ions  
for changes to the s y s t e m s  to improve  the safety, i. e . ,  d e c r e a s e  the 
probabil i ty of creat ing safety p rob lems .  Many recommendat ions  we re  made 
to  the design groups  during the cou r se  of the r epo r t  period-some we re  
accepted and incorporated into the s y s t e m s  a s  shown in F i g u r e s  2-2, 2-3  
and 2-4,  resul t ing in a s a f e r  des ign than the one repor ted  a f t e r  the Phase  I1 
study, The des ign (and the opera t ions )  a r e  not a s  safe a s  they mus t  be fo r  
the RNS to be acceptable  a s  a space  vehicle-but that  i s  due to the fact  that 
the safety ana lys i s  i s  not complete .  All of the potential safety p rob l ems  
have not been identified and a l l  that have been identified have not been 
solved.  The following recommendat ions  may  provide solutions to  some of 
these  p rob lems .  
in the ha rdware  a r e a s  the following recommendat ions  a r e  made :  
A.  El iminate ,  a s  f a r  a s  possible,  a l l  i t e m s  that can cause  a 
ca tas t roph ic  explosion in e a r t h  orbi t  ( o r  on the miss ion) .  This  i s  
one method by which radioact ive  deb r i s  can r een t e r  and impact  the 
ea r t h .  
B. Provide  redundant cryogen s t o r age  fo r  c r i t i c a l  systems-a l o s s  of 
the auxi l iary  propulsion s y s t e m  i s  in a Class  IV A fa i lure .  
C, Redundant s y s t e m s  should be physically separa ted  f r o m  each  o ther  
(Reference the Apollo 13 p rob lem)  s o  that a  fa i lure  on one 
redundant component does  not affect  the o ther  APS engines.  
D. Add  sufficient APS capabil i ty (-70 f t / s e c )  to prevent e a r t h  impact  
with a C l a s s  IV C fa i lu re  during the t r an s luna r  coas t  phase.  
E.  Provide  a n  emergency  detection s y s t e m  that will be able to detect  
a  l o s s  of flight path control  before  a  substant ia l  change in the 
flight path ha s  occu r r ed  ( s ee  assumpt ion  5, Section 3. 4). 
F. Eliminate  the cooldown l imi ta t ion on the NERVA emergency  mode 
operation.  This  5  -hour  cons t ra in t  r educes  considerably  the 
effect iveness  of the emergency  mode s ince  many of the abor t  
operat ions  l i s ted  in Table 3 -5  could not be accomplished if this  
l imi ta t ion i s  not re laxed.  Maintaining the 5-hour cooldown limita- 
t ion would resu l t  in i nc r ea sed  r equ i r emen t s  fo r  ex te rna l  rescue 
capabil i ty.  
G. Extend the emergency  mode operat ion to  a  tank-head idle mode, 
This  will a l s o  g rea t ly  i nc r ea se  the flexibility of the abo r t  
operat ions .  This  mode would r equ i r e  a  m in imum of operable  
equipment on the NERVA. 
H. Es t ab l i sh  a  space  tug a t  lunar  orbi t  and e a r t h  orbi t  fo r  ex te rna l  
r e s cue .  
A recommendat ion i s  a l s o  made to analyze  the lunar  shutt le  t r a j e c to ry  to 
de te rmine  i f  the anomaly of e a r t h  impact  during the t r an s luna r  coas t  phase  
can  be e l iminated by a  t r a j e c t o ry  modification. 
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